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1. U.S. Direct Investment Income Inflows





At the end of World War II, through large public and
private capital outflows for reconstruction and development,
the United States supplied the world with dollars and conse-
quently international liquidity. The substantial reduction
of our import barriers and our low interest rate was not
matched by other countries. Our military aid and the deploy-
ment of armed forces abroad added additional dollars to
foreign balances. In order to bring about an international
balance in trade, many leading currencies were devalued sub-
stantially relative to the dollar, and the dollar appreciated,
All these policies and programs eventually resulted in U.S.
balance of payments deficits which were initially welcomed
abroad as they allowed countries to replenish their inter-
national reserves and eventually return to currency
2
convertibility.
The balance of payments is defined as a statistical
record of economic transactions between residents of the
United States and residents of the rest of the world. The
measurement is in terms of dollars and in terms of fixed time
periods during which the transactions take place. U.S.,
Department of Commerce, Dictionary of Economic and Statist i-
cal Terms (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office,
1969;, P. 25.
p
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Joint
Economic Report 1965 , 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, p. 11.
1

The Committee for Economic Development summarizes
events after 1958 with this statement:
By 1958 the so-called "dollar shortage" had dis-
appeared. Nonetheless continued United States
expenditures to support peace, economic deployment,
and political stability around the world, and the
reappearance of extensive foreign borrowing in New
York, combined to produce continuing and larger
balance-of-payments deficits. The Western European
nations, for their part, had largely regained suffi-
cient economic strength to want to reassume a position
of greater equality and influence with the United
States in the world. In subsequent years, the door-
was opened for gold conversions to be used as a means
of exerting economic and political pressure on the
United States.
1
As this statement suggests, it is imperative that
the United States solve its balance of payments problem in
order to maintain the financial, economic, political, and
military leadership of the free world. A simple solution
for eliminating the chronic deficit would appear to be for
the United States either to cut overseas expenditures or
increase revenues from foreign countries by the amount of
the deficit. While the solution appears basically simple,
political, military, and other economic considerations have
precluded the reduction of overseas expenditures. Also,
complicating a resolution of this problem are the many
factors, both visible and invisible, which influence or
contribute to a surplus or a deficit in the U.S. balance of
payments, i.e., exports, imports, military expenditures
overseas, AID, loans, and so on. In addition, changes in
U.S., Committee for Economic Development, The




component accounts, reflects changing world conditions, and
a major change in one account can cause unidentifiable and
unpredictable indirect effects on other accounts in the
balance of payments.
Cumulative deficit
Measured against a U.S. 1970 gross national product
of 977 billion dollars, a deficit of two to five billion
dollars in the balance of payments account, on the liquidity
basis, would not appear to be a matter of immediate or
appreciable concern. However, the United States has had a
continuous liquidity deficit since 1950 except for 1957 and
1968. For the period 1950-1970, the United States has had
a total cumulative international payments liquidity deficit
2
of 4-8.7 billion dollars. This cumulative deficit has con-
siderably weakened the dollar in the international markets
and eyes of the world. Consequently, our international
creditors may, from time to time, feel that they are holding
more dollars than they want, and international confidence
in the dollar is further eroded.
The degeneration of the United States liquidity
position in the sixties, resulting from a continuous
Economic Re-port of the President , transmitted to the
Congress February, 1971, together with The Annual Report of
the Council of Economic Advisers (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1971), p. 197.
pComputation for the period 1950-70 is from the
international statistical tables in The Annual Report of
the Council of Economic Advisers, 1971, p. 299.

persistent deficit in the balance of payments, can be illus-
trated by comparing U.S. liquidity ratios during this
period:
Liquidity Ratios
I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1963 1966 1967 1968 1969
U.S. Reserves .90 .80 .72 .64 .57 .53 .50 .45 .47 .40
all liquid
liabilities
Source: Survey of Current Business
,
October, 1970, p. 25.
Statement and Importance of the Problem
The adverse movement of the U.S. liquidity position
from 0.9 to 0.4 in ten years points out the seriousness and
ultimate consequences of a sustained deficit. Because of
this continuous deficit in the United States balance of pay-
ments, a crisis of confidence in the monetary system developed
in November, 1967. The devaluation of the British pound in
November was quickly followed by a sharp reduction in U.S.
gold stock. The U.S. balance of payments deficit in 1967 rose
to S3. 6 billion with the fourth quarter running at an annual
rate of over $7 billion.
In an attempt to restore international confidence in
the dollar through balancing or creating a surplus in the
Computation of the annual rate is based on the
fourth quarter statistical data appearing in U.S., Depart-
ment of Commerce, "U.S. Balance of Payments and Reserve
Position," Survey of Current Business , June, 1968, p. 36.

United States balance of payments, President Johnson, in a
statement outlining a program of action on January 1, 1968,




The Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the
United States, in its 1968 economic report, expressed con-
siderable concern over the seriousness of the U.S. balance
of payments deficit and the controls imposed on private U.S.
overseas investments:
The result of our worsening payments position has
been an erosion of world confidence in the dollar.
Foreign dollar holders are now anxiously waiting to
determine whether the United States will at long last
exercise financial responsibility at home. In the
meantime, any one of a number of possible economic or
political developments could trigger a run on gold that
might well destroy the international monetary system
as we know it today. The shock would set back the
growth and prosperity of the free world for years to
come.
Under these circumstances, rebuilding world confi-
dence in the dollar must be regarded as the first objec-
tive of economic policy in 1968. Above all, we must
provide an affirmative answer to the questions that
increasingly are being asked abroad about our ability
—
and our willingness—to take those actions needed to
restore balanced and healthy growth to our domestic
economy.
The Administration's Balance-of-Payments Program
The Johnson administration's response to the dollar
crisis is a program of shortsighted and self-defeating
controls. The administration has swallowed the utterly
Lyndon B. Johnson, "Balance of Payments," Speech
Delivered January 1, 1968, in Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents, IV (January 8, lyb&), 2~5.

mistaken notion that the dollar can be strengthened by
limiting its us efulness. -'-
Research Question
There was and still is unanimous agreement on the
need for the United States to bring its international accounts
into equilibrium. However, there is disagreement on the
methodology for accomplishing the correction of the funda-
mental imbalance. President Johnson decided that direct
controls on funds flowing into foreign investments was the
answer. The Joint Economic Committee disagreed. Accordingly,
the basic question to be investigated in this study is
whether or not United States Government controls on the move-
ment of private capital abroad have contributed to improving
uxxc uiiloGCL uoaocS uca.j_o.xxoe Ox po.ymexxoo jjOoxuxOa ur wnc .iiei
such controls, in reality, will eventually lead to a further
weakening of the dollar and the United States leadership of
the free world. If mandatory controls have contributed
measurably to the improvement of the U.S. balance of payments
position, then they should be maintained. If, in fact, they
do not, then do they jeopardize future investment earnings
and repatriation of investment income?
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to document and examine
these restrictions on private overseas investments in order
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Joint
Economic Report 1968
,
90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 71.

7to determine if the United States should reevaluate or
reconsider private investment controls and restrictions.
Hopefully, the study will point out the utility or disutility
of these restrictions and also serve as a recapitulation of
the United States overseas private investment position.
Scope and Limitations
The balance of payments is more than a statistical
statement of a country's annual international transactions.
It is used as an analytical tool to point out significant
data and trends which affect the international stature of a
nation and to isolate any potential problem areas. While
the balance of payments consist of a multitude of trans-
actions, this study will primarily focus and concern itself
with only a small part of those transactions which belong to
the capital account and the U.S. restrictions affecting that
account. For clarification purposes, certain functional
groupings and transactions in the balance of payments must
be identified.
Functional classifications
Data are grouped into functional and subfunctional
classifications in addition to a debit or credit classifica-
tion. The main functional classifications as shown in
Appendix I is a reproduction of U.S. International
Transactions in 1968 which shows the functional and sub-
functional classifications and divisions of data. Major
functional division definitions, as defined by the U.S.
Department of Commerce Dictionary of Economic and Statisti-
cal Terms, are also included.

8tables by the Department of Commerce are:
1. Balance of goods, services, and unilateral trans-
fers. It "represents the balance on current account which
—
except for errors and omissions—must be counterbalanced by
capital movements, a change in official reserves or both."
This account includes such items as exports and imports,
travel, military expenditures, transportation, U.S. govern-
ment grants and pensions, income on government and private
investments abroad, and income on foreign investments in
the United States.
2. Transactions in U.S. private assets, net. This is
sometimes referred to as the capital account. Such trans-
actions record the acquisitions and sales by U.S. private
residents of assets outside the United States. Four sub-
functional classifications or categories of transactions
within this grouping are direct investments abroad, purchases
of foreign securities, bank claims on foreigners and private
2
claims, other than direct investments, on foreigners.
3. Transactions in U.S. Government assets, excluding
reserve assets, include loans, credits, aid and subscriptions
to foreign nations by the U.S. Government.
4-. Transactions in U.S. official reserve assets include
changes in the U.S. gold reserve, convertible foreign










currencies and the tranche position in the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). 1
5. Transactions in foreign assets in the United States
include foreign private and official acquisitions and sales
of U.S. assets. These transactions are divided into four
subfunctional divisions or categories of foreign direct
investment in the United States, purchases and sales of U.S,
securities, long-term deposits by foreigners, and foreign
2purchases of U.S. notes and money market instruments.
6. Net errors and omissions. This is the statistical
discrepancy between total recorded entries under receipts
and total recorded entries under payments. It is entered
as either net receipts or net payments, as needed in order
to fulfil], the accounting principle that the sum of the
receipts and payments must balance. The source of the
discrepancy cannot be identified with any precision.
Balance on the liquidity basis
It must be remembered that the balance of payments
reflects a current position for a given period of time and
does not reflect the total U.S. assets or liabilities over-
seas. It can be thought of as a current income/expenditure













both the liquidity basis and the official reserve transactions
basis to measure its overall current balance. The liquidity
basis measures the outflow and inflow of monetary assets or
items which can be freely converted into money with a minimum
risk of changes in the market value. Included in this basis
are all reported short-term private and bank liabilities to
foreigners and foreign holdings of all U.S. Government
marketable securities. The overall balance on the liquidity
basis is equal to "changes in liquid liabilities to foreign
official holders, changes in liabilities to other foreign
holders, and changes in official reserve assets consisting of
gold, Special Drawing Eights , . convertible currencies, and the
U.S. gold tranche position in the IMF."
Balance on official
transactions basis
The overall balance on the official reserve trans-
actions basis measures official settlements in the balance
of payments. The overall balance on this basis is equal to
changes in liquid and nonliquid liabilities (marketable
securities) to foreign official holders and changes in
official reserve assets consisting of gold, Special Drawing
Rights, convertible currencies, and the U.S. gold tranche
p
position in the IMF. The significant difference between the
The Annual Report of the Council of Economic
Advisers




two is that the liquidity basis measures changes in both
private and official liquid holdings while the official




The balance measured on the liquidity basis, which
will be used exclusively in this study, highlights the
international role of the U.S. dollar as a vehicle for inter-
national private, commercial, and official settlements. A
deficit in this account increases dollar holdings of foreign
governments and private foreign residents. There is no
urgency in a deficit as long as foreigners are willing to
hold dollars as part of their reserves or as long as the
U.S. reserve position is strong enough to ward off a run
on the dollar.
Limitations
While the accounts within the balance of payments are
never static, for purposes of this study they must be held
relatively constant in order to examine the restrictions and
usefulness of U.S. private investment restrictions abroad.
Such a position also rules out a world calamity or catastrophe
which would also distort any usefulness of this study in
regard to improving our balance of payments position through
a reconsideration of our investment restrictions. Of neces-
sity, the study will primarily concern itself with the capital
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accounts in the balance of payments with the main focus on
the restrictions to direct investments overseas. For
continuity purposes and clarification, other accounts and
their effects will be touched on from time to time but the
emphasis will remain on overseas private investment restric-
tions. Hopefully, these limitations will not inhibit or
distort the usefulness of this study.
Methodology
Areas in which research has been accomplished for





Vital Speeches of the Day
,
Executive orders, and Congressional hearings. A considerable
effort was made, where possible, to use only primary source
material. In this respect, the post World War II period has
been stressed as the area of significant interest, because
after World War II, because of its industrial and commercial
strength, the U.S. dollar was substituted for gold in
settling international debts between foreign countries.
Department of Commerce officials responsible for
insuring U.S. investor compliance with the direct investment
controls were interviewed regarding the effectiveness of
these controls. While candid in some of their remarks, they
were not responsive to direct questioning and refused to be
quoted or identified in any way.
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Organization of the Study
This paper is organized to reflect recent U.S.
Government private investment restrictions as a means of
restoring an equilibrium in the U.S. balance of payments.
First, U.S. investment restrictions are documented. Second,
the private international investment position of the United
States is reviewed. In the fourth chapter, some observa-
tions on the effects of U.S. Government manipulations to
restore the balance through investment controls are made.
Prior to concluding remarks, an alternative to capital
investment controls is presented.

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF UNITED STATES
INVESTMENT CONTROLS
Imposition of direct controls on private U.S.
overseas investments on January 1, 1968, by President Johnson
was an -unprecedented action in United States financial
history. It was the first time that mandatory controls had
been placed on U.S. private investments abroad. In imposing
the controls, President Johnson said:
To the average citizen, the balance of payments,
and the strength of the dollar and of the international
monetary system, are meaningless phrases. They seem
to have little relevance to our daily lives. Yet their
consequences touch us all—consumer and captain of
.
industry, worker, farmer, and financier. 1
The President further emphasized that the economies
of all nations, rich and poor, are tied together through
world trade and finance. If any country faltered in its
economic relationships with other countries, it would have
a direct or indirect effect on the prosperity of U.S. citizens
He reminded Americans that the health of the world monetary
system and world trade, and consequently their own prosperity,
depended upon the health of the American dollar which was
Lyndon B. Johnson, "Balance of Payments," Speech
Delivered January 1, 1968, in Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents
,




used as an international currency. He stressed this point
by saying:
We cannot tolerate a deficit that could threaten
the stability of the international monetary system
—
of which the U.S. dollar is the bulwark.
We cannot tolerate a deficit that would endanger
the strength of the entire free world economy, and
thereby threaten our unprecedented prosperity at
home .
2
President Johnson's action culminated previous
measures to reduce the chronic deficit. Since 1959, three
Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and
President Johnson—had taken various measures to establish an
equilibrium in the U.S. balance of payments.
Early Control Measures 1959-1964-
Buy American
The first dramatic step was the "Buy American"
principle to the financing of loans and grants by the
Development Loan Fund in October 1959. At that time, very
few leading U.S. citizens considered the balance of payments
deficits as a very serious threat to the international
stability of the dollar. The U.S. military assistance pro-
gram was not affected as the Mutual Security Program was





^William H. Draper, "Gold Reserve, the Dollar, and
Foreign Aid," remarks delivered before the Overseas Press





The seriousness of the problem was vividly expressed
on November 16, i960, when President Eisenhower issued a
directive to reduce and limit the number of U.S. military
and civilian dependents abroad to a total of not more than
200,000 at any one time and ordered military expenditures
abroad to be reduced both from appropriated and nonappropri-
ated funds. Other government agencies were also directed to
reduce their overseas expenditures and buy goods and
services of U.S. origin.
President Kennedy
President Kennedy, on February 6, 1961, rescinded
the unpopular limitations on U.S. dependents overseas,
recommending instead: the sale of newer weapons and
weapons systems to our allies; reduction of the customs
exemption for returning Americans from $500 to $100 on a
wholesale basis; promotion of exports; a program to
encourage the maintenance of foreign deposits in the United
States; encouragement of foreign travel to the United
States; legislation "to prevent the abuse of foreign tax
2havens by American capital abroad."
Dwight D. Eisenhower, "International Balance of
Payments," Statement and directive released at Augusta,
Georgia, November 16, I960, Vital Speeches of the Day ,
XXVII, 98.
2John F. Kennedy, "U.S. Balance of Payments and the
Gold Outflow from the United States," Message on February 6,
1961, to House of Representatives, 87th" Cong. , 1st sess.
,
Doc. No. 84, Congressional Record , CVII , 1791.
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The tariff act of 1930 was amended on August 10,
1961, and reduced temporarily the duty exemption for return-
ing U.S. residents from $500 to $100.
-
1 The next year, on
October 16, 1962, legislation to remove any tax havens in
2foreign investments was signed. However, these measures
did not stem the tide and the seriousness of the problem was
reemphasized when President Kennedy, on July 18, 1963,
called for a reduction in military expenditures overseas
and a more vigorous effort in expanding our exports and
increasing the number of foreign visitors to the United
States.
Interest Equalization Tax
To stem the outflow of private U.S. capital, Presi-
dent Kennedy supported an increase in short-term interest
rates and recommended a tax on foreign securities sold in
the United States—the Interest Equalization Tax (IET),
which would increase the interest cost to foreigners of
obtaining capital in this country through the sale of
securities. The tax would be graduated "from 2.75 per cent
hj.S., Statutes at Large , LXXV, Pub. L. 87-132,
87th Cong. (1961), 335.
2U.S., Revenue Act of 1962, Statutes at Large
,
LXXVI, Pub. L. 87-83^, 87th Cong. (1963;, 960-1069.
^John P. Kennedy, "Balance of Payments," Message to
House of Representatives on July 18, 1963, 88th Cong., 1st






to 15 per cent of the value of debt obligations" depending
upon the maturity date. This would increase the overall
cost of the issue by approximately 1 per cent. On Septem-
ber 2, 1964, the Interest Equalization Tax Act was passed
which imposed a tax on foreign securities sold in the United
2States. The law was retroactive generally to July 18,
1963.
President Johnson's Control Efforts
1965-1968"
President Johnson, in a special message on the U.S.
balance of payments on February 10, 1965, requested an
extension of the Interest Equalization Tax Act for two years
beyond December 31, 1965, an increase in the tax coverage to
nonbank credit of one to three-year maturities, new legisla-
tion to exempt from antitrust laws "voluntary cooperation"
by banks in limiting their lending abroad, legislation to
further reduce duty-free exemptions of returning American
tourists to $50 on a retail price basis, and new tax legis-
lation to increase the incentives for foreigners to invest
in U.S. corporate securities.
1Ibid.
p
U.S. , Interest Equalization Tax Act, Statutes at
Large , LXXVIII, Public Lav/ 88-563, 88th Cong (1965), 809-47
^Lyndon B. Johnson, "Reviewing the International
Balance of Payments and Gold Position," Message to House of
Representatives, February 10, 1965, Congressional Record ,




Under the authority of the Gore amendment, the
President extended the interest equalization tax to bank
loans of one year or more and requested the banking community
to limit foreign lending to 105 V er cent of the level of
loans to foreigners as of December 31, 1964-. Assurance had
been received from the Canadian Government that they would
limit the volume of new security issues sold in the United
States "to the maintenance of a stable level of Canada's
2foreign exchange reserves."
Other measures in 1965
The Secretary of Defense, Agency of International
Development (AID), and others had been directed by the
President to "cut their overseas dollar costs to the bone."^
Since 85 pe^ cent of new AID commitments at this time were
spent in the United States, very little foreign exchange
costs could be saved under AID programs. However, the
Secretary of Defense was specifically directed to shift
defense buying from sources abroad to sources in the United
States, reduce staffs overseas, streamline support opera-
tions overseas, and work with defense partners to increase





In addition to all of these measures, the President
asked for the support of American business leaders in limit-
ing their direct investments abroad. President Johnson also
called for promotion of U.S. exports and announced a program
of "See the U.S.A." in order to increase tourism to the
United States and encourage U.S. citizens to see their own
2
country rather than travel abroad.
On June 30, 1965, Congress declined to reduce further
the duty-free exemption from $100 to $50. However, the
exemption was altered from a wholesale to a retail price
basis. The amount of duty-free liquor which returning
American tourists could bring back to the United States was
also reduced from one gallon to one quart.
New legislation was enacted in 1965 which exempted
the banking community from antitrust laws when the banking
community cooperated with each other in limiting their
foreign loans. The legislation was for a period of twenty
months. On October 9, 1965, the new interest equalization
1Ibid. 2Ibid.
^"Exemption from Duty for Returning Residents,"
Congressional Record
,
89th Cong., 1st sess. , June 30, 1965,
CXI, 15264-65.
4U.S., Statutes at Large
,
LXXIX, Pub. L. 89-62, 89th
Cong. (1966), 208.
5Ibid.
6U.S., Statutes at Large
,




tax measures requested by the President were enacted into
legislation and the IET was extended to July 51, 1967.
Voluntary direct
investment controls
Despite all these measures, the deficit in the balance
of payments continued in 1965. Accordingly, in a letter to
Secretary Henry H. Fowler on December 2, 1965, which approved
new recommendations of the Cabinet Committee on the balance
of payments, President Johnson wrote: "It is private outflow
that has grown so sharply in recent years, some further
reduction is necessary if we are to solve this problem without
crippling our economy at home or compromising our leadership
2
abroad." The President concluded the letter by stating:
The government will continue to do its part. Since
I960, Secretary McNamara has reduced the balance of
payments cost of military spending abroad by about.
4-0 per cent—despite the increase in spending on
Viet Nam. Administrator Bell has reduced the balance.
of payments impact of foreign assistance by 50 per
cent.
3
Balance of payments recommendations for 1966, which
were approved by the President's letter to Secretary Fowler,
were designed essentially to stem the flow of private capital
abroad. Summarized, these recommendations were:
U.S. , Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of
1965, Statutes at Large , LXXIX, Pub, h. 89-245, 89th Cong.
(1966), 954-66.
2Letter from President Johnson to Secretary Fowler
dated December 2, 1965, released December 5, 1965, Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents
,




1. Corporations, on a voluntary basis, limit direct
investments during the two year period 1965-1966
to 90 per cent of the amount invested during the
three year period 1962-1964- . For this purpose
direct investments were defined to include capital
outflows and reinvested earnings of U.S. subsidi-
aries abroad.
2. Bank and non-bank ceiling for loans be raised from
105 P e^ cent of the 1964- base in stages of 1 per
cent per quarter to a new ceiling of 109 per cent
in the final quarter of 1966.
^
Other measures in 1966
Other recommendations approved were: to continue
the exemption of Canada from the interest equalization tax;
that all government agencies reduce to a minimum the balance
of payments impact of their operations; that legislation be
enacted to encourage foreign investment in the United States;
that foreign and domestic tourism in the United States be
promoted; to "step up" efforts by government and private
2
"Balance of Payments," Summary of recommendations
by the Cabinet Committee on balance of payments dated Decem-
ber 3, 1965, released December 5, 1965, Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents , I, No. 20, 560.
2About one-third of net capital market financing m
Canada is derived from United States sources. Historically,
the deficit in the Canadian current account was covered by
large inflows of long-term capital from the United States
through the flotation of securities. This pattern was upset
by the interest equalization tax, which increased the cost
of these securities to American buyers. To avoid a major
disruption to the Canadian economy, Canada was exempted from
the major features of the tax. Andrew P. Brimmer, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve, "United States-Canadian
Balance of Payments Prospects and Opportunities," Remarks
delivered before the First National Conference of Canadian




enterprise to expand U.S. exports. While the balance of
payments v/as not mentioned, it is interesting to note that
p
the discount rate was also increased on December 5, 1965.
The use of reserved foreign currencies in lieu of
dollars for current expenditures was authorized on Octo-
ber 15, 1966. Also, in November, legislation called the
Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 was enacted, which was
designed to induce foreign capital toward the United States
and influence other countries in the merit of equal access
to their own markets.
1967 reviewed
The deficit continued through 1966, and on January 26,
1967, President Johnson said that he was counting on the full
cooperation of businesses and banks in their continued
voluntary restraint program for corporate investments abroad
and for foreign lending by financial institutions, and he
recommended:
1. That Congress extend the Interest Equalization
Tax to July 31, 1969 and requested authority
to adjust the tax rate as monetary conditions
warranted between zero and two per cent.
"Balance of Payments," Summary of recommendations
by the Cabinet Committee, December 5, 1965, P- 560.
p
Prime rate is the interest charged by banks to
their best customers and fluctuates with the discount rate.
Discount rate is the interest charged by the Federal Reserve
on loans to member banks.
5U.S., Statutes at Large , LXXX, Pub. L. 89-677,
89th Cong. (1967), 955-
U.S., Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966. Statutes
at Large , LXXX, Pub. L. 89-809, 89th Cong. (1967), 1559-59.
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2. That a special task force be appointed to find ways
to stimulate foreign travel in the United States.
3. That efforts be made to stimulate exports, attract
more foreign investment to the United States, and
encourage further development of foreign capital
markets.
4. That he would request expansion, by $4.5 billion,
of the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank
and would continue to urge other countries to share
more in the costs arising from common defense and
foreign assistance.!
On July 31, 1967, the "Interest Equalization Tax
Extension Act of 1967" was enacted; it extended the tax to
July 31? 1969, and varied the tax as a percentage of actual
value depending upon the period of maturity from 1.05 per
2
cent to 22.5 V er cent. In August 1967, the authority for
exemption from the banking antitrust laws to assist in safe-
guarding the balance of payments position of the United
States was extended to June 30, 1969.
Mandatory direct investment
controls ordered
The deficit continued in 1967 and consequently, on
January 1, 1968, President Johnson by Executive Order 11387
dated January 1, 1968:
1. Ordered that anyone, alone or together with affili-
ates, that acquires 10 per cent interest in the voting
Lyndon B. Johnson, Economic Report of the President ,
Transmitted to Congress January 26, 1967 (Washington, D.C.
:
Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 14.
p
U.S., Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1967
,
Pub. L. 90-59, 90i:h Cong., 1st sess., 1967.




securities of a foreign business venture is prohibited,
except as authorized by the Secretary of Commerce, "from
engaging in any transactions involving a direct or indirect
transfer of capital to or within any foreign country or to
any national thereof outside the United States."
2. Authorized the Secretary of Commerce to require, as
he determines necessary, repatriation of earnings attribut-
able to foreign investments and bank deposits and other
2
short-term financial assets held in foreign countries.
3. Authorized the Federal Reserve Board stand-by
authority:
(a) To investigate, regulate or prohibit any trans-
action by any bank or other financial institution
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
involving a direct or indirect transfer of capital
to or within any foreign country or to any national
thereof outside the United States; and
(b) To require that any bank or financial institu-
tion subject to the jurisdiction of the United States
shall cause to be repatriated to the United States
such part as the Board may specify of the bank deposits
and other short-term financial assets which are held
in foreign countries by or for the account of such
bank or financial institution.
5
Restrictions imposed by the Federal Reserve in 1968
on foreign credits by U.S. banks were: (1) to reduce credit
ceilings to 103 per cent of foreign credits outstanding as of
December 31, 1964- ; (2) not to renew at maturity outstanding
loans to developed countries in Europe; and (3) to reduce
"Executive Order 11387, Governing Certain Capital
Transfers Abroad," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu -
ments






short-term loans outstanding to developed countries of
continental Europe "by 4-0 per cent of such credits outstand-
ing as of December 31, 1967.
Direct investment limits
The direct investment controls imposed "by the Presi-
dent limited new direct investment either through transfer
of capital from the United States or through earnings of the
foreign venture according to the foreign country concerned.
Countries were divided into three categories of less-developed
countries, countries that require a high level of capital
inflow for the maintenance of economic growth and financial
stability, and other developed countries and communist
2
countries. Each category is classified as an A, B, or C
schedule with separate limits on direct investments in each
schedule. The most restrictive schedule is C, which includes
developed countries of continental Europe except for Greece
and Finland. No new direct investments could be made in
these countries through transfers from the United States,
but up to 35 per cent of average earnings of the respective
ventures in 1965-66 could be reinvested.
Council of Economic Advisers, Annual Eeport of the
Council of Economic Advisers (Washington, D.C. : Government
Printing Office, 1968), p. 174.
pGottfried Haberler and Thomas Villett, Presidential
Measures on Balance of Payments Controls (Washington, D.C:






Schedule B countries were considered to be those
countries that were not yet fully developed and those coun-
tries that had in the past relied on a high level of capital
inflow from the United States to maintain their economic
growth and financial stability; i.e., Canada, Japan, Ireland.
New direct investments in Schedule B countries, including
reinvested earnings, could not exceed 65 per cent of the
1965-66 direct investment average.
In less developed countries, labeled schedule A,
capital transfers from the United States plus reinvested
earnings could not exceed in any year 110 per cent of the
21965-66 direct investment average.
Direct investments of $100,000 a year or less were
exempt from the foreign direct investment controls. This
exemption was later raised to $200,000.
Additional 1968 measures
In addition to these controls, in his statement out-
lining a program of action on January 1, 1968, the President
asked the American people to defer for two years nonessential
travel outside the Western Hemisphere and asked for appro-
priate congressional legislation to achieve this objective
of restricting nonessential travel, asked for negotiations
with NATO allies to minimize the foreign exchange costs of




Budget to find ways to reduce the number of civilian employees
overseas, and instructed the Secretary of Defense to find ways
to further reduce the foreign exchange impact of personal
spending by U.S. forces and their dependents in Europe.
In an effort to increase exports, the Export-Import
Bank Act of 194-5 was amended to extend its lending authority
and "its authority to issue, against fractional reserves,
2
export credit insurance and guarantees."
Because of the tremendous pressure being exerted on
the dollar as foreign nations and citizens converted their
"dollar IOU's" into gold, legislation was enacted in March
1968 which eliminated the gold reserve requirements for
Federal Reserve notes and for U.S. state notes and treasury
notes of 1890. This legislation removed the legal require-
ments for partial gold backing of dollars circulated within
the United States. The remaining U.S. gold supply, approxi-
mately ten billion dollars worth, could now be used to meet
the international debts of the United States. The total U.S.
gold reserve in March 1968 was $10.7 billion, with liquid
liabilities to foreigners totaling $32.5 billion. In addi-
tion, legislation was enacted in June 1968 which permitted
Johnson, "Balance of Payments," p. 24.
2U.S., Statutes at Large , LXXXI, Pub.L. 90-267, 90th
Cong. (1968).
5U.S., Statutes at Large
,
LXXXI, Pub.L. 90-269, 90th
Cong. (1968).




U.S. participation in the. special drawing rights (SDK's) of
the International Monetary Fund which would be used on a
limited basis starting in 1970.
Other measures taken in 1968 included additional
legislation to enable the Export-Import Bank to approve the
extension of certain loan guarantees and insurance on exports
in order to improve the balance of payments and foster the
2long-term commercial interests of the United States. Also,
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 provided for "a comprehen-
sive review and reorganization of all United States foreign
assistance programs, military sales programs, and programs
involving contributions and payments by the United States to
international lending institutions and other international
organizations concerned with the development of friendly
foreign countries and areas. ny
Of interest to the military was the consolidation and
revision legislation relating to reimbursable military exports.
Under this law the President is allowed to sell military goods
for cash or credit to friendly foreign nations.
Before leaving office, President Johnson said that the
direct investment control program must be maintained, the
1U.S., Statutes at Large
,
LXXXI, Pub.L. 90-34-9, 90th
Cong. (1968).
2U.S., Statutes at Large , LXXXI, Pub.L. 90-390, 90th
Cong. (1968).
5U.S., Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 , Pub.L. 90-55^,
90th Cong. , 2d sess.
,
1968.




interest equalization tax must be renewed, and the Federal
Reserve program of voluntary restraint of foreign lending
continued in order to protect the U.S. balance of payments. 1
In Just a few years, 1964-68, voluntary constraints
on investments had proliferated into major mandatory controls
Proliferation of Major Investment Controls
Federal Reserve Control Dept. of Commerce Control
1964
INTEREST EQUALIZATION TAX
Tax equal to 2.75% - 15% of Debt Value
1965
Voluntary Bank Restrictions
105% of 1964 Loan Base
1966
Increase Loans to 109%
of 1964 Loan Base
Voluntary Direct Investment




to 103% of Credits out-





Schedule A: 110% of 1965-66 Avg,
Schedule B: 65% of 1965-66 Avg.
Schedule C: 35% of 1965-66 Avg
Investments of $200,000 or
less were Exempt
"The Economic Report for 1969," Speech delivered
January 16, 1969, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents ,
V, No. 3 (January 20, 1969;, 101.
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Mandatory Control Trend Halted, 1969
On April 4-, 1969, President Nixon hesitantly took
the first steps to relax and reverse government foreign
investment regulations as he modified, by Executive Order
11464, the effective tax rate of the Interest Equalization
Tax from 1 1A per cent to 3/4 of 1 per cent and partially
relaxed the overseas investment restrictions. Repetitiously,
he also called for trade expansion, competitive trade policy,
more foreign travel to the United States, and a fair share
by our friends in sharing the balance of payments common
defense costs.
Revisions to investment controls .
Specific revisions made by President Nixon in the
regulations governing the overseas investment program were:
Raising from 200,000 to one million the amount
companies could invest and still remain exempt from
curbs. [In 1970, an additional four million was
exempt if used in underdeveloped countries. In Janu-
ary, 1971, the one million exemption was raised to
two million. 2]
The right for companies to invest 30% of their
1968 foreign earnings as an alternate to using a
1965-66 base period.
Dropping the effective IET rate to 3/4 of one
percent. [Congress also extended the IET to March,
1971. 5 3
Richard Nixon, "Balance of Payments," Statement
released April 4, 1969, Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents , V, No. 14 (April 7, 1969), 509-10.
2Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers
,
1971, p. TW.
5U.S., Statutes at Large , Pub.L. 91-128, 91st Cong.,
1st sess., 1969" (Passed November 26, 1969.)
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Special investment rates for some overseas
industries.
A separate export-loan bank ceiling.
The tight money market and high interest rates in
the United States caused U.S. banks to borrow over ten
2billion Euro-dollars in 1969. However, in recognition of
normally, historically, higher interest rates outside the
United States, the 1970 and 1971 revised guidelines for
banks and other financial institutions, with one exception,
continued the voluntary restraints in effect since 1965.
Banks now will have a general ceiling equal to its old lending
ceiling and a separate Export Term-Loan Ceiling equal to
one-half of one per cent of its 1968 total assets that can
be used to finance new U.S. exports.
Summary
The Interest Equalization Tax imposed in 1964 was
apparently effective in restricting foreign access to the
U.S. market as the tax raised the purchase cost of foreign
securities sold to Americans. However, after its enactment,
foreigners switched to long-term borrowing from U.S. banks.
Consequently, voluntary bank restriction on loans to 105 Ver
cent of the 1964 loan base was called for in 1965. Since
1






March, 1970, p. A-76.
^"Revised Guide Lines for Banks and Nonbank Finan-
cial Institutions," Federal Reserve Bulletin
,
January, 1970,
p. 11; and January, 1971, p. 9.
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banks are responsive to Federal Reserve directions, they were
responsive to the voluntary restrictions.
The voluntary program of restraint on direct invest-
ments in 1966 to 90 per cent of the 1962-64- base was parti-
ally successful as business feared mandatory controls.
However, it appears that in 1967 businesses believed manda-
tory controls were imminent, and this precipitated a surge
of direct investments overseas.
President Johnson considered the controls at least
partially successful as he called for their renewal prior
to leaving office and there was a $171 million surplus on
the liquidity balance in 1968. However, with the same
program still in effect, this surplus disappeared into a
1969 record liquidity deficit of $7,012 million. These




INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT POSITION
OF THE UNITED STATES
Historical Review
Direct controls on U.S. overseas private investments,
especially direct investments, were the only really signifi-
cant measures imposed in 1968 by President Johnson to restore
the balance in our balance of payments. Yet, these same
investments, in the past, had provided the United States,
with few exceptions, a surplus in the overall investment
account by returning each year more income from prior invest-
ments than had been expended each year on new investments.
Historically, Britain, France, and Germany have used
income gained from its overseas investments to pay for deficits
in other areas of their balance of payments. In the 100-year
period 1815-1914- , Great Britain accumulated a merchandise
trade deficit of nearly $70 billion. More than $50 billion
was offset by income from foreign investments.
Albert Imlah, Economic Elements in the Pax





Prior to World War II
The United States did not begin to export significant
amounts of private capital until almost 1900. Until the end
of World War II, the United States, despite its relatively-
large financial base and size, had relatively little of its
financial resources invested in foreign investments. At the
end of 194-5? total book value of U.S. direct foreign invest-
ments was $7.2 billion and other private investments was
$6.3 billion. 2
After World War II
In the immediate years after World War II, 194-6-194-9,
private U.S. capital outflow was insignificant and did not
even total one billion dollars a year. A modest increase in
private investment occurred during the years 1950-1955- After
1955? probably in anticipation of higher profits and currency
convertibility, and as foreign economies displayed increased
stability, U.S. overseas private investment increased to over
three billion dollars a year and in 1961 finally topped four
billion dollars a year. During the period 1961-1969, the
United States had an average yearly investment outflow of
$4.8 billion a year. Table 1 shows the annual outflow of
investment capital for the period 1946-1969.
Jeffrey G. Williamson, American Growth and the
Balance of Payments 1820-1913 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1964), p. 267.
2U.S., Department of Commerce, Balance of Payments
Statistical Supplement
,
(Eev. ed. ; Washington, D . C .
:






















194-6 -230 +92 +35 -103 -310 -413
1947 -749 +36 -85 -798 -189 -987
19^-8 -721
-95 +26 -790 -116 -906
194-9 -660 +27 -107 -740 +187 -553
1950 -621 -275 -220 -1116 -149 -1265
1951 -508 -353 -84 -945 -103 -1048
1952 -852 -87 -127 -1066 -94 -1160
1955 -735 +91 +94 -440 +167 -383




- ; sZ> +20 -261 -1064 -191 -1255
1956 -1951 -421 -182 -2554 -517 -3071
1957 -24-42 -470 -389 -3301 -276 -3577
1958 -1181 -1250 -194 -2625 -311 -2936
1959 -1372 -668 -258 -2298 -77 -2375
I960 -1674 -662 -193 -2530 -1349 -3878
1961 -1598 -762 -263 -2623 -1556 -4180
1962 -1654 -969 -258 -2881 -546 -3426
1963 -1976 -1105 -593 -3674 -785 -4459
1964 -2328 -677 -1426 -4431 -2147 -6578
1965 -3468 -759 -320 -4547 +753 -3794
1966 -3661 -481 +225 -3917 -415 -4332
1967 -3137 -1266 -26 -4429 -1209 -5638
1968 -3209 -1254 +138 -4325 -1087 -5412
1969 -3070 -1494 -94 -4658 -1133 -5791
-39,287 -12,988 -4,677 -56,952 -12,087 -69,039
Note: Portfolio investments combine the outflows of capital
for foreign bonds and stocks. Other long term is the
capital outflow for banks and other claims.
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Busi-
ness
,
June, 1968, p. 28; October, 1969, p. 26; and
October, 1970, p. 24.
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The overall value and income derived from U.S. over-
seas private investments for the post World War II period,
19^-6-1969, is depicted by Table 2. Total excess of income,
fees, and royalty receipts over total private investment
outflows for this period was $18.6 billion.
The fact that direct investments comprise almost
two-thirds of the total private investments overseas is shown
by Table 3. Also worthy of note is the fact that, as de-
picted by Figure 1, aggregate income inflows from direct
investments in the form of repatriated income, royalties and
management fees, on a worldwide basis, exceeded direct invest-
ment outflows in every year of the period 194-6-1969- Direct
investment earnings were more than double direct investment
outflows. These earnings have substantially contributed to
the $31.5 billion increase in the value of direct investments
over outflow. In addition, these direct investments have
generated repatriated income in the amount of $70.5 billion.
For an outflow of $39.3 billion, the United States has gained
$102 billion. X
Limitations of Definitions
The relationships that exist between these accounts
and other accounts in the balance of payments are difficult
to perceive. In some cases, because of many intangibles, a
The $102 billion was computed as follows:
1969 total value of direct investments +70,763
+ Direct investment income repatriated +70,552
- Direct investment outflow -39,28^



















194-6 13,525 -413 751 64 815
1947 14,904 -987 1,036 77 1,113
1948 16,301 -906 1,238 83 1,321
19^-9 16,94-9 -553 1,297 100 1,397
1950 19,004 -1,265 1,484 126 1,610
1951 20,838 -1 , 048 1,684 129 1,813
1952 22,731 -1,160 1,624 130 1,754
1953 23,771 -383 1,658 128 1,786
1954 26 , 594- -1,622 1,955 136 2,091
1955 29,136 -1,255 2,170 158 2,328
1956 33,364- -3,071 2.468 229 2,697
1957 56,930 -3,577 2,612 238 2,850
1958 4-1,118 -2,936 2,538 246 2,784
1959 4-4,800 -2,375 2,694 348 3,042
I960 50,266 -3,878 3,000 403 3,403
1961 55,513 -4,180 3,561 463 4,024
1962 58,810 -3,426 3,948 580 4,528
1963 66,513 -4,459 4,151 660 4,811
1964 75,419 -6,578 4,930 756 5,686
1965 81,147 -3,794 5,384 924 6,308
1966 86,321 -4,332 5,659 1,030 6,689
1967 93,603 -5,638 6,235 1,136 7,371
1968 102,519 -5,412 6,922 1,246 8,168
1969 110,152 -5,791 7,906 1,369 9,275
-69,039 76,905 10,759 87,664
Includes direct investments, portfolio investments,
and long- and short-term claims by banks and others.
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Balance of Payments of
the United States 1949-1951
, p. 155; Balance of Pay-
ments Statistical Supplement
,
Rev. ed~ 1965, PP- 24*8-
4-9; Survey of Current Business , September, 1965,
p. 23; October, 1968, pp. 20-26; October, 1969,
pp. 23-30; and October, 1970, pp. 23-27; The Annual



















19^6 7227 887 588 64 652 -230
19^7 8366 1161 869 77 946 -749
1948 9625 161
3
1064 83 1147 -721
1949 10700 1408 1112 100 1212 -660
1950 • 11788 1575 1294 126 1420 -621
1951 12979 2236 1492 129 1621 -508
1952 14721 2327 1419 130 1549 -852
1953 16253 2258 1442 128 1570 -735
1954 17631 2398 1725 136 1861 -667
1955 19395 2878 1912 158 2070 -823
1956 2171 229 2400 -1951
1957 25394 3561 2249 238 2487 -2442
1958 27409 3014 2121 246 2367 -1181
1959 29827 3241 2228 348 2576 -1372
I960 31815 3566 2355 403 2758 -1674
1961 34667 3815 2768 463 3231 -1598
1962 37226 4235 3044 580 3624 -1654
1963 40686 4587 3129 660 3789 -1976
1964 44430 5071 3674 756 4430 -2328
1965 49424 5505 3963 924 4887 -3468
1966 54777 5784 4045 1030 5075 -3661
1967 59486 6116 4517 1136 5653 -3137
1968 64756 7148 4975 1246 6219 -3209
1969 70763 8171 5639 1369 7008 -3070
85,853 59,793 10,759 70,552 -39,287
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Balance of Payments







49; Survey of Current Bus:Lness, S 1965,
p. 23; June, 1968, p. 29; October, 1968, pp. 20-26;
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shift in one account will vary the other accounts. Also, it
is difficult at times to distinguish between a direct invest-
ment and a portfolio investment, or in some cases, if an
investment was made at all because of the limitations of
definitions.
A direct investment refers to an investment made to
create something abroad which will make, process, or market
goods or something for local consumption and in some cases
third areas. Such operations normally employ and weld
United States technical expertise, capital and machinery to
expand the productive capacities of the country they locate
in.
On the other hand, a bank loan or credit to a
foreigner is strictly a financial transaction between the
lender and the borrower with a fixed maturity, interest
rate, and amortization schedule. No equity interest is
acquired. A portfolio investment may take two forms--
purchase of foreign bonds and debentures or purchase of
foreign stocks by a U.S. resident. Bond purchases are like
bank credits at fixed terms with no equity interest. Purchases
of stocks involve equity interest.
When 25 per cent or more control is attained, the
investment is considered a direct investment. This assumes
a measure of managerial influence. However, equity ownerships
U.S., Bureau of the Budget, The Balance of Payments
Statistics of the United States , a review and appraisal
(.Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 62
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of between 10 and 25 per cent have been included as direct
investments in the balance of payments data. The President
used 10 per cent of control as the point at which direct
controls would be applicable.
Tangible Influences of Direct Investments
Sources of funds
Many sources of funds are used to finance direct
investments abroad including borrowing from foreign banks,
sale of debentures or equities abroad, retained earnings of
foreign affiliates, accumulated depreciation and depletion
allowances, sales of machinery, services, and technology for
credit or equity interest, and sometimes borrowing from U.S.
international or foreign government lending or aid agencies.
For example, over 80 per cent of the financing of U.S. corpora-
tions abroad in 1964 came from external financing abroad and
not from direct investments from the United States.
It is also important to understand that capital out-
flows can be company-affiliate book transactions or credits
to finance goods and services.
Royalty income
Income earned in the form of royalty and management
fees was recorded in past balance of payments statements as
income from miscellaneous services. These royalties and fees
Samuel Pizer and Frederick Cutler, "Financing and
Sales of Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Firms," Survey of Current
Business
,
November, 1965, p. 15.
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are more specifically related to direct investments and are
now depicted separately on the statement. However, in
analyzing the balance of payments statement this income
should "be attributed to direct investments.
Export influence
Direct investments also have a direct influence on
our favorable surplus of exports. A Department of Commerce
survey in 1963-1964 revealed that exports to foreign affili-
ates account for one-fourth of total exports of comparable
manufactured goods and semi-manufactured goods from the
United States. Foreign affiliates of U.S. companies in the
manufacturing and extractive industries imported at least
$5 billion of U.S. goods in 1963- All purchases of U.S.
goods by "che foreign affiliates could not be identified by
the parent companies who reported. While not representing
total imports by the foreign affiliates, the $5 billion
2
reported constitutes 23 per cent of U.S. exports in 1963.
Exports in 1964 to foreign affiliates increased by
nearly 18 per cent. "Exports rose nearly 18% from $5-3
Samuel Pizer and Frederick Cutler, "U.S. Trade with
Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Firms," Survey of Current Business
,
December, 1964, pp. 20-24. A Department of Commerce source,
on February 12, 1971? stated that this study had not been
updated.
2Ibid.
^Samuel Pizer and Frederick Cutler, "U.S. Exports to
Foreign Affiliates of U.S. Firms," Survey of Current Business
,
December, 1965, p. 12. It should be noi;ed that a portion of
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billion in 196$ to $6.3 billion in 1964 while total U.S.
exports rose about 15%. Exports to the affiliates were 25%
of all U.S. exports in 1964 as compared with about 24% in
1962 and 1963. ,T Exports to U.S. foreign affiliates
2
accounted for one-third of total nonagricultural exports.
Department of Commerce findings, therefore, conclu-
sively documented, for the first time, the fact that direct
investments have a beneficial impact on exports and that
direct investments abroad are essential to the growth of
U.S. exports.
Prior to this survey, it had been assumed that
exports were dependent mostly on the price and quality of
the export and that exports could be promoted by aggressive
selling. It is now apparent that corporations can increase
their sale of goods in foreign markets, and consequently
increase U.S. exports, when they have a presence in that
market.
Payback period
Economists and businessmen have argued about the
period of time it takes for a direct foreign investment to
be offset by income repatriation and other earnings. A
the increase in exports to affiliates in 1964 might be a
result of better bookkeeping by U.S. firms concerned as a
consequence of the 1963 survey. (This study on effects of





good example is Professor Bell's study published during the
Revenue Act hearings of 1962. To be accurate, in addition
to investment income, the payback period should give credit
to service and royalty fees, investment which is incurred in
the form of equipment, materials and personnel without
transfer of dollars, and the additional exports that result
from the expansion of operations abroad.
Because of the variables, the exact payback period
is undeterminable, but the majority of argument indicates
that the capital outflow will have been paid for in a
"balance of payments sense" in a period from two to eight
years. Table 4- depicts the straight earnings yield on book
value of direct foreign investments abroad. Of interest is
the fact that for any straight eight to nine year period,
the earnings return is nearly 100 per cent of book value.
Unemployment
It has been argued that overseas investments create
unemployment and that direct investments also cause an
increase in imports. Professor C. P. Kindleberger , Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology, in a letter to Congressman
Thomas B. Curtis, stated:
It is true that a deficit in the current account
in the absence of capital movements is deflationary.
When the deficit is in the basic balance, however, or
Philip V. Bell, "Private Capital Movements and the
U.S. Balance-of-Payments Position," Study prepared for U.S.
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Factors Affecting the
United States Balance of Payments (Washington, B.C. : Govern-




EARNING YIELDS OF DIRECT INVESTMENTS, 1950-1969
(Millions of Dollars)
T\ * _L_ YieldDirect
Investments (Per Cent)Year Book Value Earnings ofBook Value
1950 11788 1575 13..4
1951 12979 2236 17..9
1952 14721 2327 15..8
1953 16253 2258 13-.9
1954- 17631 2398 13..6
1955 • 19395 2878 14..8
1956 22505 3298 14,.7
1957 25394 3561 14..0
1958 27^-09 3014 11,.0
1959 29827 3241 10,.9
I960 31815 3566 11..2
54667 3815 11..0
1962 37226 4235 11..4
1963 40686 4587 11..3
1964 44450 5071 11,.2
1965 49424 5505 11,.1
1966 54711 5784 10..6
1967 59267 6116 10..3
1968 64756 7148 11,.0
1969 70763 8171 11,.4
Sourc e
:
Judd Polk et al . ,
Balance of Paymei
,
u. 1 . Production Abroad . and the
its (Nejw York: National . Indus-
trial Conference Board, 1966), p. 28 ; u. S. Depart-
ment of Commerce,
,
Surve\j of Current Business
,
September, 1965, p. 23; October, 1968, pp. 20-26;
October, 1969, p. 29; and October, 1970, p. 26.
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in the overall balance the answer—is not given as
easily. The outcome depends upon what would have
happened to the capital if it had not flowed abroad.
If the capital would otherwise have been invested at
home and used up local resources, the deficit may be
regarded as deflationary, since either domestic invest-
ment or full transfer of the capital outflow would
have put greater pressure on domestic resources. On
the other hand, if the alternative to the capital
outflow was merely an increase in liquid savings in
the United States, the fact that a part of the capital
outflow was transferred through the payments mechanism
could be regarded as expansionary. The preferred
answer in my Judgment, is that a deficit in the basic
balance, or in the overall balance, deriving from a
current account surplus but a still greater capital
outflow, is "relatively deflationary.
"
1
Direct investments have many effects on the balance
of payments. Each individual investment affects the balance
of payments differently depending on the time and method of
placement, the payback period, repatriation vice reinvestment
of earnings, yields, subsidiary market position, export
enhancement, and many other factors.
Adverse effects
Some adverse effects of direct investments on the
balance of payments can readily be seen in the U.S. consumer
Charles P. Kindleberger , in U.S. Congress, Joint
Economic Committee, The United States Balance of Payments
(Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 425.
Mr. Meyer Bernstein, AEL-CIO International Affairs Director,
United Steel Workers, in an interview on February 17, 1971,
stated that labor takes no formal position on direct invest-
ments overseas except when that investment directly interferes
with U.S. labor negotiations. He cited the 1967-68 copper
strike as an example. Copper companies were able to increase
their overall profits by increasing their imports. Conse-
quently, these companies had no incentive to bargain with
labor on the settlement of the strike because they were in
a better profit position as long as the strike went on.

4-8
market. For example, Sears now sells a Japanese-made sewing
machine. In answer to a query, a Sears official surmised that
Sears gained control of the Japanese company for the sole
purpose of having that company produce the sewing machine for
the Sears market. Unfortunately, no statistical information
is available on how many imports are being received from U.S.
companies from their overseas subsidiaries for sales in the
United States.
Another adverse effect of direct investments is that
some exports would have normally been sold in areas serviced
by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies. "It is impossible
to measure the extent to which foreign sales of affiliates
might be substituting for potential U.S. exports or to deter-
mine the amount of goods now exported through affiliates that
2
might in any case have been exported through other channels."
In 1968, Professor Gary Hufbauer (University of New
Mexico) and Professor F. Michael Adler (Columbia University)
concluded a statistical-economic investigation of the effect
of U.S. foreign investments on the displacement of exports by
direct investments which was published by the Treasury Depart-
ment. The study was criticized by the Machinery and Allied
Products Institute in a letter dated January 27, 1969, to
Henry S. Eeuss, Chairman, Subcommittee of International Exchange
and Payments, Joint Economic Committee. The letter stated that
the "inadequacies of the Treasury study assumptions underlying
their economic models invalidate its conclusions." "Explicit
recognition by the authors of many or most of these inadequa-
cies does not change the fact." The letter was published in:





January, 1969, "$• 69. On
February 12, 1971, a high official in the Department of Com-
merce, who refused to be quoted, stated that both authors have
since recanted their position as set forth in their study and
no other studies in this area have been made.
Pizer and Cutler, "U.S. Exports," (Dec. 1965), p. 12.

49
Indirectly related to direct investments is the influence
of foreign aid. Exports financed by foreign aid can be
totaled and matched against the appropriation but nobody knows
what goods or capital would have been exported if the aid
had not been tied to U.S. goods or if a country had not
received the aid. More important, substitutions of imports
by these countries receiving U.S. aid cannot be identified.
Other Long-Term U.S. Capital
Besides direct investments, considerable foreign
portfolio investments were made by U.S. citizens after World
War II. The rapid increase in portfolio capital investments
from 1958 to 1964 by U.S. citizens can be explained by the
high rates of growth in Europe and Japan, the restrictive
nature 01 capital markets in these areas and the much lower
interest rates and borrowing costs in the United States.
Since 1964, the interest equalization tax has increased the
cost to foreigners of raising capital in the United States
and accordingly the tax is a restraint on the purchases of
foreign securities by U.S. citizens. However, portfolio
investments in foreign securities, as shown by Table 1 (page
36), have not significantly decreased since the imposition
of the tax. Since the tax is restrictive, it can be assumed
that it has had some effect, but the amount of effectiveness
Peter B. Kenen, Statement in U.S. Congress, Joint
Economic Committee, Outlook for United States Balance of
Payments
, Hearings , 88th Cong. , 1st sess. , 1965, p. 1J0.
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cannot be measured and the amount of securities that would
have "been sold without the tax cannot be calculated or
estimated.
Other long-term capital movements, both bank and non-
bank, are insignificant, except for 1963 and 1964- , and are
depicted by Table 1. The increase in these two years can be
attributed to switching as foreigners borrowed from U.S.
banks rather than through the sale of securities which would
be subject, after passage, to the provisions of the Interest
Equalization Tax Act.
It has been estimated that 15 per cent of long term
bank commitments go to developed countries and a somewhat
higher portion to less developed countries to directly
finance U.S. exports."^
Foreign Capital Movement to the United States
Foreign capital movements to the United States during
the period 19^-6-1965 did not have a significant trend. How-
ever, since 1965, foreign investments in the United States
(Table 5) indicate that foreigners have discovered the U.S.
stock market as evidenced by an eight billion dollar shift
into corporate bonds and stocks during the period 1965-1969.
Also, the drop in corporate stocks held between 1968 and 1969
reflects the drop in the U.S. stock market prices in 1969.
Very significant is the fact that U.S. bank loans from




FOREIGN ASSETS AND INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
(millions of dollars)
1965 1968 1969
Non-Liquid 29644 47654 48872
Private 27562 42890 43945
Direct investments 8797 10815 11818
Corporate and Other Bonds 875 4214 4800
Corporate stocks 14599 19551 18140
Liabilities reported by
U.S. Banks 513 3166 2490
Other 2578 5144 6697

















Total U.S. Liabilities to
Foreigners
. 58,759 81,248 90,790
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business, October, 1970, p. 25.
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foreign banks increased $16.2 billion during this four-year
period. The $9 billion increase in bank loans made between
1968 and 1969 reflects borrowings of U.S. banks in foreign
markets. U.S. banks, searching for funds to offset the 1969
tight domestic credit crunch, borrowed heavily in the Euro-
dollar market. Regulation Q limits the rates that U.S. banks
can pay on domestic deposits but not on deposits obtained
through foreign branches which, in effect, stimulated the
demand for funds from the foreign financial markets.
It is interesting to note the contrast in the invest-
ment pattern of the foreign investor to the U.S. investor.
Foreign investors had previously invested the majority of
their capital in U.S. portfolio investments and are now
switching to corporate stocks and liquid loans. The U.S.
investor leans toward direct investments. Perhaps this
investment pattern can be attributed to the current U.S.
managerial and technical world leadership.
Summary
At the end of 1969, U.S. direct investment overseas
had grown to $70.7 billion. Direct investments combined
with other U.S. private investments had reached the unprece-
dented amount of $110.2 billion. In addition, the U.S.
Government had nonliquid credits and claims amounting to
Evelyn M. Parrish, "The U.S. Balance of Payments:
Fourth Quarter and Year 1969," Survey of Current Business
,
March, 1970, p. 27.
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$30.7 billion not including $16. 9 billion of monetary-
reserve assets.
Foreign private and governmental investments and
assets in the United States amounted to $90.8 billion, of
which $41.9 billion was short-term and $48.9 billion
($11.8 billion direct and $37*1 billion portfolio and other)
was long-term.
The most significant capital export and import items
and their importance can perhaps best be depicted by looking
at the major capital transactions for a given period. In
1969, net capital exports were $7.2 billion. The U.S. Govern-
ment accounted for $2.2 billion and the private sector
$5.0 billion. The main outflow of funds in the private
sector was for direct investments of $3-0 billion. Foreign
securities newly issued in the United States accounted for
$1.6 billion, and the remainder can be attributed to U.S.
banks. Net capital imports amounted to $12.1 billion, of
which $8.4 billion was deposits and money market paper held
in the United States. The second major capital import was .
investments of $3.0 billion in U.S. securities other than
2Treasury issues. Because of the listing distortions m
the major divisions of the accounts, the 1969 private invest-
ment income of $9.3 billion is listed under exports of goods








As ascertained from Tables 1, 2, and 3 (pages 36,
58, and 39), if the income generated from investments is
correctly attributed or offset against the capital export
account, then capital exports are not causing the persistent
deficit in the balance of payments. In fact, the flow of
funds into foreign investments has generated a healthy annual
repatriation of income which results in a surplus for the
private sector. The deficit is not due to capital exports
but to government expenditures. This point will be explored
further in Chapter v.
Of major importance are the tangible effects direct
investments have on other accounts within the balance of
payments even though these effects cannot be precisely
measured. The majority of the material cited would indicate
that restrictions on direct investments have an adverse




EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROLS
Since 1959, governmental restraints and controls to
protect the balance of payments have progressed gradually
from mild voluntary programs on private investments to strict
mandatory controls. A review of presidential measures and
legislation enacted by the Congress to eliminate this persis-
tent deficit reveals that every major presidential proposal
also called for:
1. Reduction of overseas military expenditures
affecting the balance of payments.
2. Reduction of other governmental agency spending
which might adversely affect the balance of
payments.
3. Increasing U.S. exports.
4. Increasing tourism to the United States.
While some reduction in military expenditures overseas
was actually realized in earlier years, it is considered that
the measures to reduce governmental expenditures that were
cited on each occasion were more to placate the American tax-
payer and businessman than to reduce actual expenditures
because it would be necessary to change radically the American
political overseas objectives before substantial reductions
in overseas military and other governmental expenditures could
be realized. As a matter of record, military expenditures




The real burden and brunt of the governmental measures
to restore the balance has been borne by American businesses
and private investors. Perhaps to psychologically prepare the
world and American businesses for the investment controls,
restraints and restrictions were called for before mandatory
controls were imposed.
Legality of mandatory controls
President Johnson used the authority of a Congres-
sional Act of 1917 1 as amended in 1933, to invoke mandatory
controls on direct investments. Essentially, the Act of 1917
authorizes the President to regulate or prohibit any trans-
action in foreign exchange by any person under United States
jurisdiction. The Act forms part of the Trading with the
Enemy Act, and the 1933 amendment provides for its use during
a national emergency. President Johnson did not declare a
national emergency but used the eighteen-year-old national
emergency declared by President Truman in Proclamation 2914-
2
of December 16, 1950. The national emergency declared in
1950, and yet to be revoked, was a consequence of the Korean
war and had nothing to do with the balance of payments. Since
the mandatory controls imposed by the President were not
legally contested by U.S. businesses or the Congress, it is
"Executive Order 11387, Governing Certain Capital
Transfers Abroad," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu -
ments
,




assumed that the imposition of investment controls under
these laws was legal and valid, regardless of the ethics in
imposing the controls under laws that were not relevant.
Review of Early Constraints
to Improve Balance
Unfortunately, it is impossible to measure the exact
effects of each restriction on the U.S. economy or on the
world economy. However, one must remember the complex inter-
acting phenomena in the balance of payments, in that the pay-
ments are the result of numerous interacting forces, both
domestic and foreign, and when one force is changed other
forces in the balance of payments also change either tangible
or intangible to the original force change.
Government expenditures
Several observations on the tangible effects of these
restrictions can be made. The 1959 restriction required AID
purchases to be made in the United States in order to reduce
the foreign exchange cost of AID. This policy forced
recipients of AID to buy goods in the United States regardless
of the price. This policy amounts to a partial devaluation
of the foreign aid dollar since it usually means paying
higher prices, sometimes as high as 30 per cent or more.
Since 1962, the Department of Defense has required that goods
Gottfried Haberler and Thomas Willett, Presidential
Measures on Balance of Payments Controls (Washington: American
Enterprise Institute, 1968), p. 8.
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and services for overseas use be purchased in the United States
unless the dollar cost raises the price by 50 per cent or more.
This policy can be described as a partial devaluation because
it has meant that substantially more dollars are needed to
provide the same military effort abroad. In other words, the
military must pay up to 50 per cent more on some of its pur-
chases because the purchases must be procured from a United
States source. With respect to defense purchases overseas
for use in the United States, Executive Order 10582 establishes
6 per cent, plus duty, as the price differential beyond which




In the early sixties, administrative exports thought
that faster economic growth would solve the problem as U.S.
exports would increase and U.S. capital would be encouraged to
stay at home. The economy expanded but the capital outflow
increased rather than decreased. Apparently, administration
officials were victims of the fallacy that high profits
attract overseas direct investments. Actually, many direct





U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The United
States Balance of Payments-—Perspectives and Policies (Wash-
ington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 196$ J, p. 96.
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in the United States. The average earnings of U.S. direct
investments overseas in 1967 was 10.3 per cent as compared
to an 11.1 per cent profit after taxes in 1967 for corporate
investments in the United States. Corporate taxes in foreign
2
countries are roughly the same as U.S. corporate taxes.
While profit is the motivation of investment, the majority
of overseas investment decisions are made apparently in
response to competitive necessities that affect the earning
position of the companies involved or threaten their overall
operation or market position.
Operation mix
After the failure of the expanding economy to reduce
capital outflow and eliminate the "balance of payments deficit,
the Administration tried manipulating fiscal and monetary
policy and juggling interest rates.
Operation "mix" combined comparatively tight money,
that is, high interest rates, with an expansionary
fiscal policy [budget deficits] . The former was sup-
posed to improve the balance-of-payments problem by
inducing capital to stay at home. The latter, deficit
financing, would look after internal expansion.^
See Table 4 for earning yields on foreign direct
investments. U.S. corporate profits computed from Table IX,
Survey of Current Business
,
September, 1968, p. 9-
2Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury, A Review of Balance of Payments Policies , State-
ment to U.S~T Congress , Joint Economic Committee, T969
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 37
vJudd Polk etal. , U.S. Production Abroad and the
Balance of Payments (New York: National Industrial Confer-
ence Board, 1966), p. 42.




Operation "twist" followed operation "mix." This
policy combined high short-term interest rates and compara-
tively low long-term rates. The high short-term rates would
attract capital while low long-term rates would supplement
deficit financing and stimulate internal growth and employ-
ment. This policy actually stimulated portfolio investment
in foreign securities, encouraged direct investments abroad,
and consequently had an adverse effect on the balance of
payments.
In this study of capital outflows during this period,
economist John Hogan commented:
The chagrin felt by the Kennedy Administration
over the dissipation of gains in the basic balance
through capital outflows foreordained that U.S.
balance of payments policies would be amended to
cope with capital flow problems. Short-term interest
rates in the United States had been increased in a
delicate operation which sought at the same time to
constrain long-term rates as a precaution against
interruption of the two-year-old economic expansion.
Since unemployment of the labor force and under-
utilization of industrial capacity were still serious
problems at the beginning of 1963, some action course
other than increased interest rates would have to be
determined.
It was immediately clear that a policy-mix
including some form of control on capital flows
would now be necessary and, given the pexigency of




John D. Hogan, The U.S. Balance of Payments and






On the effects of interest rates, Edward Bernstein,
a research economist, appearing before the Joint Economic
Committee, testified that short-term funds follow the inter-
est rate. To illustrate his point, he used Secretary
Dillon's testimony of February 14, 1961, before the Foreign
Relations Committee. Secretary Dillon had observed that in
I960 the U.S. Federal Reserve discount rate was 4- per cent,
the German Bundesbank rate was also 4- per cent, and the Bank
of England had a 5 per cent rate. As business began to slow
in the United States, the Federal Reserve eased its rate to
~5Yz per cent. However, in Germany there was a domestic boom
and the German Bundesbank raised its rate to 5 per cent.
The Bank of England immediately raised its rate to 6 per
p
cent.
As a consequence of the imbalance in short term
rates, a flood of short-term funds left New York for these
markets. The balance of payments deficit jumped from a
$2.9 billion rate in the first six months of I960 to a
|4.7 billion rate in the last six months. This caused an
outflow of U.S. gold, as confidence in the dollar was
shaken.
Edward M. Bernstein, in U.S., Congress, Joint










The lesson to be learned by all this is that in
these days of convertible currencies there must be
close cooperation and coordination between our finan-
cial and monetary authorities and those of the major
industrialized countries of Western Europe.
1
With regard to private short-term capital movements,
experience has shown the difficulty of curbing speculative
or other large-scale movements of such funds even with
2
exchange control. While some short-term capital is used
to finance exports, some of the capital is speculative and
follows the interest rates. In addition, short-term capital
is responsive to weak economies and contributes greatly to
flights of capital when economic conditions unstabilize.
Interest Equalization Tax
Manipulations of policy and the juggling of the
interest rates did not stop the capital outflow and the
Interest Equalization Tax was enacted in 1964. Essentially,
this tax was a sharp devaluation of the foreign portfolio
investment dollar as the foreign investment becomes more
expensive in terms of dollars than it would be without the
tax. The tax allows the United States to maintain, if
desired, low long-term interest rates without risking a
substantial outflow of capital to higher . interest rates.
The tax was effective in stabilizing the amount of capital
raised in this country by foreign countries and companies.
1Ibid.
p
Arthur I. Bloomfield, in U.S. Congress, Joint Eco-





The so-called "voluntary" program to reduce bank
lending abroad administered by the Federal Reserve is a mis-
nomer in that no bank can afford to be on bad terms with
the Federal Reserve. Consequently, the voluntary program
is really a mandatory restraint on foreign bank lending.
Voluntary direct
investment constraints
Because of the voluntary restrictive program that
began in 1965, U.S. incorporated companies with affiliates
abroad -began borrowing money in foreign capital markets and
used the proceeds of such borrowings to finance investments
in their affiliates. Although interest rates were signifi-
cantly higher than in the United States, the companies
placed a large number of these issues during early 1966 on
2the Euro-bond market. United States companies were forced
Emil L. Nelson and Frederick Cutler, "The Inter-
national Investment Position of the United States in 1967,"
Survey of Current Business , October, 1968, p. 22.
p
The Euro-dollar market is a market within a country
for bank deposits denominated in foreign currencies. The
great preponderance of such deposits is denominated in U.S.
dollars. The size of the market in 1969 was estimated to
be $30 billion. The Euro-dollar market converts deposits
into earning assets through interest arbitrage operations
with other foreign banks or through direct conversion into
loans or investments. The market is an over-the-telephone
market without a pledge of collateral. Trading units are
usually in blocks of Si million or more. The Euro-Dollar
Market and Its Public Policy Implications , Paper No. 12, pre-
pared for use of the Joint Economic Committee (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 1-8.
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to offer higher yields on these bonds as competition for funds
in the Euro-bond market increased. Companies switched to
bonds convertible into stock of the U.S. parent company in
order to hold the yields down. Such borrowings at a higher
rate of interest increase the costs of doing business for the
U.S. affiliates, and bonds converted into stock could possibly
dilute the future earnings of the present investors.
President Johnson's Program
The three essential elements of President Johnson's
program to eliminate the deficit were (1) proposed travel
expenditure tax, (2) imposition of border taxes, (3) manda-
tory controls over direct investments.
Travel expenditure tax
The travel expenditure tax would be designed to slow
down travel to foreign countries by U.S. citizens. This tax
proposal was very unpopular with Congress and the U.S.
public, and therefore a tax was not imposed. Any tax which
would restrict American travel would be likely to lead to
retaliation by other countries and also to widespread evasion
of the tax. Consequently, any tax on United States citizens
traveling abroad would be self-defeating. Also, any serious
consideration of such a tax would spur U.S. citizens into
traveling before a tax could be imposed, and therefore not
even a short-term surplus or advantage would be realized.
Nelson and Cutler, "International Investment




The imposition of border taxes would necessitate
establishing a new governmental agency to administer and
collect the tax. This would result in considerable ineffi-
ciency and cost. It would reverse the United States policy
of removing trade barriers. It would cause other countries
to retaliate, and consequently no real advantage would
accrue. Eventually such a tax would become a political tool.
Direct investment controls
The last major element of President Johnson's program
was the imposition of controls on direct investments. The
reason for these controls was not clear, as businesses had
generally adhered to previous voluntary guidelines except in
1967 when the feeling grew among businesses that the Adminis-
tration was considering further controls. Businesses, in
general, had partially adjusted to the previously imposed
voluntary controls, and consequently the impact of direct
controls was not as severe as it would have been.
Capital shifts
The announcement of mandatory curbs on foreign direct
investment transactions intensified borrowings by U.S.
companies and pushed up rates in the Euro-bond market to a
7-7-5 P©3? cent yield and led to a pronounced shift to the
use of convertible issues during the period of high
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yields. The Euro-bond cannot legally be sold to an American
except through the secondary market with payment of the
interest equalization tax. "As one Swiss banker puts it 'a
present to the non-American investor from the U.S. Government
p
and U.S. Corporations. *
"
There is a common assumption that the U.S. balance
of payments is unaffected when American companies
borrow through the medium of convertible Euro-bonds.
But estimates indicate that perhaps as much as one-third
of the money going into convertible bonds now was
switched out of other dollar securities or diverted from
direct investment in Wall Street. Swiss bankers think
the switching is growing more and more pronounced to the
point where one of them says that convertibles really
constitute an undermining of the Johnson measures "to
protect the balance of payments." Specially, he adds
"the recent Chrysler issues were in large measure
bought with money realized from the sales of Chrysler
shares. "3
This shifting of funds vividly illustrates the fungi
-
bility of money and the inadequacy of any controls to regulate
supply and demand in a free or quasi-free economy.
Repatriation of earnings
The restrictions on private direct investments also
contain another far reaching implication which will inhibit
.
the growth and future returns of U.S. company affiliates
abroad. Since companies can only reinvest 35 Ver cent of
their earnings in developed countries and 65 per cent of their
Direct investments by U.S. companies which are




September 15, 1968, p. 3-
Robert Ball, "Personal Investing," Fortune , Septem-
ber 15, 1968, p. 159.
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earnings in intermediate developed countries, the balance
has to 'be repatriated except where laws of the foreign
country prohibit such repatriation. The effects of these
controls on U.S. multinational corporations were summarized
by a U.S. manufacturer:
The regulations force us to borrow funds we do not
need. They oblige us to bring back to the United States
an abnormal amount of dollars. They make it more diffi-
cult to finance exports through the medium of foreign
affiliated companies. They make planning for the future
difficult and uncertain."!
Perhaps even more harm is being done to many smaller U.S.
corporations undertaking foreign business activities because
of the administrative and psychological barriers resulting
from the strict regulatory limitations on the retention of
profits. These funds could be used by these companies for
2
expansion and payment of debts.
Tax on dividends
Because of the necessity of the affiliate to pay to
foreign governments a tax on the dividends sent to the
parent, there is an additional reduction of funds available .
to the company. If the United States did not require
repatriation, this tax would not have been otherwise paid
until such time that the company felt that economic condi-
tions within the company required such repatriation.
Institute of U.S. Taxation of Foreign Income, Inc.,
New York, in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, A Re -
view of Balance of Payments Policies , Hearings , 1969, (Wash-







Consequently, it is an additional burden on earnings of the
affiliate which degrades its overall market position. "Some




The issuance of detailed regulations to carry out
President Johnson's program is the responsibility of the
Office of Foreign Direct Investments (OFDI). The Commerce
Department office has codified these regulations into a
2fifty-page document which contains legal and technical
language that would confuse and discourage any normal busi-
nessman. "Not even the OFDI ' s own staff agree on what the
provisions mean."
Analysis of Results of
President Johnson's Program
Since the mandatory controls on direct investments
and other investment restrictions were designed to achieve
a balance in the U.S. balance of payments in 1968, and since
there was a slight surplus of $171 million, it would appear
that President Johnson's measures to restore the balance were
successful. On January 16, 1969, in his annual message to
Jack M. Behrman, "Assessing the Foreign Investment
Controls," Law and Contemporary Problems (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Law School) , Winter, 1969, p. 90.
p
Code of Federal Regulations
,
Title 15, Commerce
and Foreign Trade, Revised as of January 1, 1970, pp. 391-
441.




Congress, President Johnson said: "Our international accounts
were in balance in 1968—for the first time since 1957. Much
of the improvement came from the program I announced in an
atmosphere of world financial crisis a year ago."
At a news conference on January 17, 1969, the Presi-
dent was asked: "How, sir, did you make the deficit in the
"balance of payments disappear in the last two weeks of your
2
administration?" The President replied that it was a
combination of long and hard work and that Secretary Fowler
had "spent his last few months going around the world trying
to bring as many dollars in as he could." Also, that his
policies had encouraged U.S. business institutions to do some
of their financing abroad, and foreign investments had been
attracted to the United States by the U.S. stock market.-'
While the balance was restored, the 1968 Presidential
measures to restore the balance had, in fact, little effect
on the restoration of the balance. However, the controls
did apparently inhibit the outflow of funds in the investments
accounts but to what extent can not be determined. From a
comparison of the 1967 and 1968 international accounts,
Table 6, some observations on the effects of the Presidential
measures can be made:
"Economic Report for 1969," Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents
,
January 20, 1969, p. 100.
2
"The President's News Conference of January 17,
1969," National Press Club, Washington, D.C., in Weekly Compi-
lation of Presidential Documents
,





SELECTED U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN THE 1967 AND 1968
U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ACCOUNTS
1967 1968
Exports, Merchandise Adjusted, Excl. Military
Imports, Merchandise Adjusted, Excl. Military
Balance on Nonmilitary Trade
Travel to the U.S. by Foreigners
Travel by U.S. Citizens Abroad
Balance on Private Travel
Military, Expenditures
Income from Private U.S. Investments Abroad:
Direct Investments
Other Private Assets
Fees on Royalties from Direct Investments
Royalties and Fees
Private Payments on Foreign Invest, in U.S.
Transactions in U.S. Private Assets:
Direct Investments Overseas
NET Foreign Securities Transactions
Long-Term Bank & U.S. Resident Claims
Short-Term Bank & U.S. Resident Claims
Total Transactions in Private Assets
Transactions in Private Foreign Assets
in the U.S.
:
Direct Investments in U.S.






















+ 1156 + 1246
+ 7570 + 8168
- 1695 - 2231
- 3137 - 3209
- 1266 - 1266
4 + 184
- 1214 - 1049
- 5621 - 53^-0
+ 250 + 319










Total Private Foreign Asset Transactions
in the U.S. + 2732 + 6692
Source: For 1967: Survey of Current Business
p. 32; and October, 1970, p. 23.
For 1968: Survej of Current Business









1. Direct investment overseas did not decrease. The
program for 1968 was supposed to reduce direct investments
by $1 billion, but investments actually increased $172 million,
Consequently, there was a $1,172 million difference in what
the program was supposed to do and what it actually did.
2. Foreign lending by financial institutions was to
reduce the balance of payments deficit by at least $500 mil-
lion. It appears that a reduction of $500 million was met.
3. The travel deficit goal was a reduction of this
deficit by $500 million. Since no controls or taxes were
imposed, this reduction goal was not met. The deficit in
the travel account decreased from $1.5 billion to $1.3 bil-
lion. This was a difference of $300 million from the
announced goal.
4. Balance of payments costs of government commitments
overseas were to be reduced $500 million. Despite reduc-
tions in government and military overseas staffs, curtailment
of overseas travel by the military, increase of military sales
to friendly nations, and other unannounced measures, military
spending overseas actually increased by $190 million. This
resulted in a $690 million difference from the announced
program.
5. By reducing trade barriers and providing better
export financing and insurance, the nonmilitary trade surplus
was to be increased $500 million. Instead of increasing, the
Federal Reserve Bulletin, January, 1969, p. 11-
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nonmilitary trade surplus decreased from a surplus of $3.5
billion to a surplus of $526 million. This difference between
the actual surplus and the planned surplus was $3.5 billion.
6. Foreign investment and travel in the United States
were to be encouraged, but no planned or announced goals
were set.
The effects of the program are tabulated in Table 7.
It can readily be determined from Table 7 that President
Johnson's program failed completely except that it may have
prevented some additional private capital from flowing
abroad.
TABLE 7
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PROGRAM TO REDUCE/ELIMINATE
























Totals +3.0 -2.6 -5.6
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Flight of capital to the
United States in 1968
Inflation in the United States, with a resultant
forty-year high in interest rates, the Czechoslovakia
invasion by Russia, and the 1968 Franc crisis caused a major
flight of capital from Europe to the United States. As a
consequence, the U.S. "balance of payments was "balanced, with
a slight surplus, for the first time in eleven years. Addi-
tional military developments which contributed to the "flight
of capital" to the United States was the growing strength
of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and the unstable
Middle East crisis. Also, international tension was eased
by the start of the Vietnam peace talks and the United States
demonstration of fiscal responsibility with its 1968 tax
increase. These events, combined with an overheated U.S.
economy and resultant forty-year high in U.S. interest rates,
precipitated and encouraged the "flight of capital" from
Europe and several billion dollars poured into U.S. invest-
ments from foreign sources. These investments coupled with
a booming inflationary U.S. economy pushed the U.S. stock
market higher. As the market climbed, this encouraged further
foreign investment.
Trade advantage loss
One serious adverse effect on the U.S. balance of
payments was the loss of some trade advantage. In addition
"U.S. Stocks Attractive to Foreign Investors," The
Magazine of Wall Street
,
February 1, 1969, p. 18.
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to some export prices increasing because of inflation, imports
increased because of the booming economy and the increased
willingness of the U.S. consumer to spend. Real growth was
around 5 Ver cent, with an additional 4 to 5 per cent infla-
tion. Consumers had 7-5 per cent more to spend with consump-
tion rising 8.5 per cent. As a result of the increase in
consumption and imports, the U.S. trade balance suffered.
1968 surplus explained
As an overall consequence of these events, $6.5 bil-
lion of foreign capital flowed into private investments in
the United States in 1968 as compared to $2.7 billion in 1967.
This capital inflow was combined with an $8.1 billion return
from previous U.S. private overseas investments, of which
5 billion was income from direct investments and 1.2 billion
was from direct investment fees and royalties. Accordingly,
it is concluded that income from private overseas investments,
"special" transactions, and the "flight of capital" from
Europe caused the first U.S. balance of payments surplus since
1957 when the Suez crisis caused a similar flight of capital.
The 1969 Liquidity Deficit
While the 1969 liquidity deficit was $7.06 billion,
there was an estimated $2.71 billion surplus in 1969 on the
official transactions basis. This difference reflects two
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Perspective 68
(New York, 1969), p. 3.
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major items in the measurements. First, it appears that in
1968, President Johnson, despite controls, was able to attain
a surplus in the balance of payments only through some
"special" financial transactions. Essentially, by the sales
of time deposits with an original maturity of one year or more,
and through sales of nonmarketable government securities pay-
able prior to maturity only under special conditions,
President Johnson was able to switch $2.82 billion of U.S.
liabilities from liquid to nonliquid categories in 1968.
In 1969? $3.2 billion was switched back to the liquidity basis
as past borrowings became due and were not renewed. This
2increased the 1969 liquidity deficit by $3.2 billion. About
$7.2 billion of the difference between the liquidity and
official transactions basis in 1969 can be attributed to the
high borrowing of Euro-dollars and other dollars held by
foreigners by U.S. banks through their foreign branches.
"These bank borrowings count as a deficit on the liquidity
basis but are treated basically as a favorable inflow on the
official settlement basis. "^
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The 1969
Economic Report of the President , Hearings , 91st Cong.
,
1st sess. , 1969, p. 412.
p
"Payments Surplus High in 4th Quarter Failed to
Avert Record Deficit for 1969," Wall Street Journal
,





Future Effects of Investment Controls
Three major effects of the mandatory controls on
foreign investments starting to appear in the "balance of pay-
ments accounts are worthy of mention even though the data
base is not yet substantial enough for a complete analysis.
First, since 1968 the deficit attributable to errors and
omissions increased from a -$514- million in 1968 to a
-$2,965 million in 1969 and is forecast to be a -$2.04 billion
in 1970. Consequently, the United States, in two years, had
an adverse flow of funds amounting to $4.9 billion which it
cannot account for. In contrast, the average errors and
omissions for 1956-60 was a plus $175 and for 1961-65 was a
minus $910. Devlin and Kruer suggest that this large
increase in errors and omissions reflects unrecorded flows
2
of U.S. funds to the Euro-dollar market.
A second major effect appears to be the substantial
increase in investment income paid to foreigners, as illus-
trated from the following data appearing in the annual
report of the Council of Economic Advisers:
David T. Devlin and George R. Kruer, "The Inter-
national Investment Position of the United States: Develop-
ments in 1969," Survey of Current Business , October, 1970,
p. 22; and Annual Report of the Council of Economic
Advisers





Average 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970a
Balance on
investment income 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.8 4.4 4.5
U.S. investments
abroad 4.9 6.5 6.9 7-7 8.8 9.6
Foreign investments
in U.S. -1.3 -2.1 -2.4 -2.9 -4.5 -5-3
Average of first three quarters, seasonally
adjusted.
Source: The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers
,
1971, p. 14-8.
It appears from these data that overall interest payments to
foreigners has risen sharply since the imposition of the
controls and reflects the substantially increased borrowings
of U.S. companies and banks in the foreign exchange market.
A third major effect is that future returns through
repatriated earnings have been reduced because of the limits
imposed on the amount of earnings companies can presently
reinvest. This amounts to borrowing future returns to pay
today's cost.
Summary
While imposition of direct investment controls may
have been politically expedient for the President, it was a
short-term solution which will adversely affect future
returns. It is possible that the President placed controls
on investments in order to limit the outflow of dollars in
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the short run and thereby rectify the immediate imbalance
while hoping that long-range influences would favorably
adjust our international position to a surplus. Since the
controls are short-range and partially dependent on periodi-
cal congressional action for renewal, it appears that the
President completely ignored a long-range program because
it was politically expedient or because he considered that
long-range influences would actually restore the balance.
Concerning the controls, the statement by the 1968
Joint Economic Committee quoted earlier is an excellent
overall summation:
The Johnson Administration's response to the dollar
crisis is a program of short sighted and self-defeating
controls. The Administration has swallowed the utterly
mistaken notion that the dollar can be strengthened by
limiting its usefulness. -*-
Most of these policies were designed to give the
United States time to correct the fundamental imbalances in
the balance of payments. However, the discriminatory
nature of each of these controls has and will continue to
generate ill-feeling abroad. For example, in a statement
to the 1969 Joint Economic Committee, the Irish Industrial
Development Authority pointed out that in order to attract
investments in manufacturing, Ireland had given outright cash
grants in the amounts of one-third to two-thirds of the cost
of land and buildings and had foregone taxes for ten years on
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Joint
Economic Report 1968
,




all profits derived from exports of these companies.
Repatriation requirements means the return of funds to the
United States which "are not attributable to U.S. investment
in the first place and taxing in the U.S. of those funds on
which the Irish Government has foregone taxes."
How critical is the continuous U.S. deficit? For
many countries which have based the international price of
their monetary unit on the U.S. dollar, the problem is very
critical. For the average U.S. citizen, the problem is
remote but also critical as continuous deficit could precipi-
tate a monetary crisis throughout the world with a corre-
sponding drastic reduction in exports and imports with a
resultant world economic recession.
The possibility of crisis and world recession almost
became a reality in March 1968, when a crisis of confidence
in the U.S. dollar occurred and U.S. monetary reserves
flowed out of the United States at a rate of more than
$4-00 million a month. By the end of March 1968, the United
States had lost $2.4- billion in gold in six months. Rumors
of possible devaluation of the dollar climaxed on the weekend
of March 16-17, when U.S. tourists in Europe could not change
their dollars into foreign currencies or cash their travelers
checks. For the European central bankers, a U.S. domestic
Adrienne Curtin on Behalf of the Irish Industrial
Development Authority, in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Com-




tax increase became a critical test of United States fiscal
responsibility.
Partial confidence in the dollar was restored in 1968
with the imposition of a 10 per cent surtax on domestic
income and the removal of the partial gold backing of dollars
circulated within the United States. These factors, combined
with a 1969 all-time high interest rate and the advent of
Special Drawing Rights in 1970, took the pressure off the
dollar. This is reflected by the fact that United States
2gold reserves increased by one billion dollars in 1969.
However, as long as our deficit continues, it will affect and
influence military spending and troop movements abroad,
foreign aid, economic growth and stability, business invest-
ments, and other military and political decisions relating
to international affairs.
Robert J. Elson, "How the Old Politics Swamped the
New Economics," Fortune , September 1, 1968, p. 75-
Federal Reserve Bulletin, March, 1970, p. A75.

CHAPTER V
AN ALTERNATIVE TO CAPITAL EXPORT CONTROLS
In the ten-year period 1959-1968, an increasing
number of controls on capital exports were imposed with
little effect.
The policy to restrain capital exports has been a
series of failures because it has not been based on
sound economic theory. Each failure has been followed
by a further escalation and the policy has now reached
the stage of comprehensive and drastic mandatory
restrictions .
1
Consequently, the specific controls "must be judged a
failure" because the balance in the international accounts,
2
which was promised each for the next has not been achieved.
Measures which were only temporary at the beginning were
extended and gradually grew into a mandatory program.
Two principles have been demonstrated: the "fungibility of
money," which enables it to flow abroad despite the artifi-
cial restrictions, and how specific and temporary controls
tend to multiply and become permanent.
Gottfried Haberler and Thomas Villett, Presidential
Measures on Balance of Payments Controls (Washington, D.C.:





























Source: Annual Report of the Council of Economic




Despite restrictions, American businesses have pro-
vided the government each year with a surplus in the private
balance of payments accounts. However, the U.S. government
consistently spends more than the surplus provided by private
business, and a deficit results. In the twenty-two-year
period 194-6-1967, the private sector in the balance of
payments produced a surplus of over $113 billion while the
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government sector produced an approximate deficit of
$161 billion as follows:
U.S. Government Outflows 1946-1967
(Millions of Dollars)
Net government grants, transfers service
payments, and income receipts $ - 53,668
Net government loans and transactions
outstanding - 24,965
Total economic $ - 78,653
Military expenditures -53,980
LESS: Military sales + 7,408
Net military expenditures -46,572
Military grants
-55,945
Total military - 82,515
Total economic and military $ -161,148
These totals show that prior to mandatory controls,
the private sector consistently provided large dollar inflows
to almost offset the large deficits in the governmental
accounts. It would appear that the obvious solution would
be to cut government spending or to increase the surplus in
the private sector. Yet, it was the private sector that
had controls and restraints placed on it. Such controls
would eventually inhibit the growth of future income from
the private sector.
Computations from Survey of Current Business
,
June, 1968, and Annual Report of the Council of Economic
Advisers, 1968
, pp. $06-07- Surplus from private sector
includes net capital flow, investment income, and net




The 1968 Joint Economic Committee expressed deep
concern over governmental expenditures overseas:
In the long run, we must recognize that our
governmental foreign expenditures (military costs
of some $4-. 25 billion per year), plus some hundreds
of millions due to foreign aid leakage are the root
of our "balance- of-payments difficulties. Our trade
accounts, our investment accounts and our travel
accounts are all, in combination, in overall balance
or slight surplus. Long-term action, therefore,
must be concentrated on the governmental account. 1
The committee went on to explain that it was unreasonable
for the United States to expect, in a competitive world, to
be able to increase its trade surpluses in order to cover
2the costs of enormous overseas military expenditures.
Also, in the long run, matters could not be improved by
reducing imports or by cutting off our flow of investment
funds abroad, or hj reducing travel of American citizens
abroad. "All of these are techniques that will quickly
lead to retaliation by other countries. ny
The Committee concluded that:
The President's balance-of-payments program is
inadequate for it does little about reducing the
balance-of-payments cost of our military expendi-
tures abroad. The drain of such expenditures on
our reserve position must be terminated quickly.^
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Joint
Economic Report 1968 (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing










Military expenditures abroad in Europe and Vietnam
are the most adverse items in contributing to the U.S.
deficit. The annual foreign exchange costs of our troops
in Germany were estimated to be about $800 million, and for
Vietnam about $1.5 billion per year. Two Yale doctoral
candidates in economics, testifying before the 1969 Joint
Economic Committee, estimated the direct and indirect
balance of payments costs of Vietnam to be in the neighbor-
hood of about $4 billion a year. Additionally, the 1968
Joint Economic Committee estimated that another $2 billion
was the foreign exchange cost of the U.S. military posture
elsewhere. Representative Moorhead expressed the view that
if our military posture had been substantially increased in
Vietnam then it would have jeopardized and precipitated a
possible collapse of the international monetary system.
Devaluate the dollar
An obvious but extreme alternative for restoring
the balance would be to devaluate the dollar. However,
competitive devaluations around the world would precipitate
-'-Ibid.
p
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, A Review






1st sess. , 1969, p. 109.










a world economic crisis and depression. Another method of
devaluation would be to raise the price of gold but,
eventually, world prices would readjust and a new inter-
national reserve crisis would result. Also, raising the
price of gold rewards the Soviet Union, South Africa, and
some other countries including private speculators. Mean-
while, every nation that had relied on the United States




President Johnson rejected a complete reduction of
government spending overseas and/or the devaluation of the
dollar as alternatives in favor of selected controls. Yet,
if these solutions are ruled out for policy reasons, then
only one alternative and real solution to our chronic
balance of payments problem appears feasible: increase the
return of private income from overseas. Since a highly
favorable trade surplus appears impossible to sustain in an
inflationary economy or in variance to domestic economic
policy, then the United States must increase its inter-
national income from private overseas investments, and such
income is not increased by restricting the base upon which






American industry with its mastery of mass marketing
techniques, distribution, and servicing can easily compete
in foreign markets with direct investment enterprises while
foreign direct investors in the United States could have a
serious problem from U.S. competitors. Accordingly, the
United States has an economic advantage in technology,
research and development, and marketing, which it should
capitalize on rather than restrict. Such technology and
mass production should be exported through direct invest-
ments overseas, as such investments, from a balance of
payments sense, return the full balance of payments costs
in the form of income and additional exports in two to
eight years.
Table 9 illustrates what can be accomplished with
direct investment returns. Estimates of balance of pay-
ments effects in European manufacturing are shown in two
variants.
The earnings rate used in the table is higher than
the average 1967-1969 foreign investment return. The table
does not consider capital appreciation by inflation or the
variances of exports and imports under certain changing
economic conditions. Also, the table does not consider
that the direct investment is normally far less than the
total investment. For example, other capital can be
borrowed at a fixed interest cost by the sale of bonds in
the foreign market or by borrowing from a foreign bank.
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capital investment induced a company to invest. The company
invested $4,000, of which 25 per cent was a direct invest-
ment from the United States and 75 per cent was through
borrowing or selling "bonds in the foreign market at a cost
of 8 per cent. A 12 per cent return on $4,000 is $480.
An 8 per cent interest cost of $240 is deducted, leaving
earnings of $240. Accordingly, the direct investment of
$1,000 returned 24 per cent vice 12 per cent. This effect
would repatriate the direct investment far faster than that
repatriation illustrated by Table 9.
As illustrated by Variant One and Variant Two in
Table 9, a logical alternative and long-range solution to
the restoration of a balance or surplus is to increase
direct investments overseas. This would require the
elimination of direct investment controls. However, in
eliminating the controls, the short-range stability of the
world dollar must be considered.
Removal of Controls
The first direct investment controls which should
be immediately eliminated are those controls which limit
investments to underdeveloped countries under Schedule A.
It is impossible to understand why such controls were ever
imposed on these countries, or the ambivalence of U.S.
policies toward these countries. For example, the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1969 created the Overseas Investment
Corporation to mobilize and facilitate the use of U.S.
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private capital and skills in the economic and social
progress of less developed countries. This corporation
encourages direct investments in underdeveloped countries
by guaranteeing such investments against loss due to
confiscation, expropriating, war, revolution, or insurrec-
tion. It was incorporated at $20 million as an "agency of
the United States under the policy guidance of the
Secretary of State." The Corporation has a maximum insur-
ance contingent liability for private investments at any
p
one time of $7-5 billion. By insurance, the Department
of State encourages direct investments in underdeveloped
nations while the Department of Commerce restricts such
investments. This ambivalence is a striking sign of
bureaucratic incompetence.
Early in 1969, prior to the creation of the Overseas
Investment Corporation, Charles Fiero, Director of Foreign
Direct Investments, U.S. Department of Commerce, testified
before the Joint Economic Committee that the direct invest-
ment quotas for underdeveloped countries had not been fully
utilized. The Committee appeared to have him in a difficult
situation on this point when they asked him why he had quotas
for these countries if they are not utilized. Mr. Fiero
was unresponsive to this point, as he testified that if
quotas were removed for these countries it would probably
1U.S., Statutes at Large, Public Law 91-175, 91st




result in one-half-billion-dollar balance of payments costs.
His reasoning is unclear and unexplained, as he first testi-
fied that controls were not restricting investments in these
countries; yet, removal of the quotas would result in a
half-billion-dollar movement of direct investment funds to
these countries over the then established quotas, which had
not been fully utilized.
The second step in the removal of the controls would
be to eliminate the requirement to repatriate in effect
35 pe^ cent of earnings from schedule B countries. This
would permit companies to reinvest in profitable expansion
through the use of retained earnings. Since there is a tax
by the foreign government on earnings repatriated, the cost
of expansion through earnings would be cheaper for these
companies. Following this, all direct investment quotas
should be removed.
The last but greatest impact on our balance of
payments would be the removal of direct investment controls
in schedule C countries, basically Western Europe.
Repatriation of earnings in these countries is forcing U.S.
subsidiaries to borrow money in order to repatriate earn-
ings. Elimination of the controls would enhance their
competitive position and growth, which would greatly con-
tribute to their future income and the repatriation of
income to the United States.
o
U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Review
f the Balance of Payments Policies
, pp. 141, 192-93.
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If the United States desires a maximum amount of
earnings repatriated in any given period of time, it should
give these companies a tax incentive, not a mandatory
directive. An extreme tax incentive would be not to tax
any of the returns provided no direct investments were made
to the company from the United States. This would encourage
companies to expand through borrowings in the Euro-dollar
market, which in turn would help keep the dollar stable.
At the same time, the higher costs to these companies in
dealing in the Euro-dollar market would be offset by the
tax advantage gained on repatriated earnings.
In the short run, if a temporary deficit could not
be sustained, the immediate imbalance caused by increasing
overseas investments would have to be offset. International
dollar stability could be maintained by U.S. banks for a
given period of time. U.S. banks could be encouraged and
directed to borrow and hold Euro-dollars for stabilization
purposes. The interest cost on such bank borrowings would
be less than the returns on the U.S. expanding direct
investments. The U.S. Federal Reserve could reimburse U.S.
banks for their costs. Eventually, direct investments would
resolve the balance and obviate the need for bank borrowings.
In addition, the U.S. Federal Reserve could intervene in
European money markets, by buying or selling forward
exchange, to stabilize the dollar. A recent example of
such stabilization was the intervention of the Federal
Reserve in the trading of the German mark. In order to
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stem the flow of Euro-dollars to Germany, which was under-
mining the German anti-inflationary measures, the New York
Federal Reserve Bank sold Deutsche marks three months
forward. By so doing, the Federal Reserve increased the cost
of swapping Euro-dollars to higher-yielding marks.
Summary
Expanding direct investments would not only repatri-
ate themselves in a balance of payments sense in a few years
but would also provide for a growing surplus in the invest-
ment account, which would eventually provide a surplus,
other factors remaining relatively constant, in the overall
balance of payments. By immediately terminating some of
the direct investment controls, followed by a reversal of
others, overseas direct investments would increase. Inter-
national dollar stability could be maintained by U.S. banks
and the Federal Reserve until such time as repatriation of
earnings from direct investments balance the accounts.
lnN.Y. Fed. Acts on Flow of Eurodollars," The Sunday





The strong viewpoint expressed by the 1968 Joint
Economic Committee against maintaining our overseas military-
posture in order to reduce our balance of payments exchange
costs is considered extreme.
However, this view points out how serious, sensitive,
ridiculous and detrimental to sound military and political
judgment the imbalance in our international accounts has
become. Basing a strictly military decision on the foreign
exchange cost of that military decision is considered an
extreme folly. Whether or not military commitments overseas
should be maintained, increased, or decreased should be
based on sound political policies and judgments made in the
light of international treaties, commitments, goodwill, and
harmony and not on the foreign exchange costs of such
policies.
. The basic problem is not and has not been world
liquidity. The basic problem is the persistent United States
balance of payments deficit. If the United States balance
of payments deficits continue substantially in the future,
these deficits will jeopardize the new Special Drawing Rights




stability of the dollar. Consequently, it is imperative that
international confidence in the dollar be maintained now and
in the future.
Controls Are Self-Defeating;
Contrary to the Johnson Administration's reasons for
imposing controls on investments, it is concluded that the
controls are self-defeating, whether voluntary or mandatory,
and that they Jeopardize the present as well as the future
U.S. balance of payments position and growth of the world
economy:
1. Why should anyone hold dollars when more extreme
controls seem likely if present controls do not accomplish
their purpose?
2. Since an estimated one-quarter of U.S. exports are
purchased by U.S. overseas affiliates, restrictions on their
expansion will also limit the future expansion of exports.
3. Some forms of direct investments were transfers of
capital inventory and equipment and resulted in an increase
in exports without any investment capital leaving the country.
These transfers count against the company as a direct invest-
ment. Consequently, because of the direct investment restric-
tions, overseas affiliates can possibly defer such purchases
or buy comparative equipment in a foreign country. Therefore,
as companies strive to maintain their investments within the
control limitations established, exports of this nature from
the United States can be expected to decline. Accordingly,
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a reduction of this type of investment should be expected
with a 'resultant decrease in exports.
4. Investment controls increase the costs and restrict
new capital investments in U.S. overseas subsidiaries by
U.S. citizens. Consequently, foreign businesses gain an
advantage over the U.S. subsidiary competitor.
5. There are inequitable features which will eventually
result in political difficulties with friendly nations.
6. In the long run, a reduction of economic growth will
result in those countries where investments would have been
made. This is not in the best interests of the United
States and is actually contrary to foreign aid objectives.
7. Controls discriminate against any new investments
or newer companies in favor of the established U.S. sub-
sidiary which can usually obtain some capital in foreign
local markets.
8. Controls could foster the development of hostile
trade blocs especially if a border tax is also imposed.
9. These controls could foster the retaliation and/or .
restrictions by foreign governments on foreign investments
by their citizens.
10. The repatriation of earnings by U.S. subsidiaries
is not subject to direction by the Secretary of Commerce
or the Treasury although unfair discriminatory and political
action and pressure might be applied by the Department of
Commerce. U.S. subsidiaries are subject to the laws of
the countries in which they locate and repatriation of
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earnings over a certain amount might be in direct violation
or opposition to the policies of that foreign country.
Brazil is a good example. Consequently, Executive Order
11387, which authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to require
such repatriation, appears to be an untenable requirement.
11. Earnings that are repatriated because of govern-
mental pressure or controls, which would not have been
repatriated in the current year, provide an expedient method
for the government to borrow future foreign exchange returns
in order to partially satisfy the current deficit. Of
course, such repatriation will aggravate future balance of
payments positions.
12. Since investments are restricted, future income is
also reduced. In addition, since some companies may lose
their competitiveness because of the high cost of foreign
capital, loss of income from previous investments might also
result. Table 4 (page 4-6) shows that the straight earnings
yield of direct foreign investments has dropped from a
1960-1965 average of 11.2 per cent to a 1967 low of 10.3 Ver
cent. Perhaps this earnings loss is a direct reflection
of investment controls and the increased cost of foreign
capital and/or the partial loss of competitiveness due to
lack of adequate capital.
13. A deceiving but serious consequence of these invest-
ment controls is the degradation of preemptive technology,
maintenance and management. It can be readily understood
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that once certain types of technology, equipment, mainte-
nance, and management have been successfully established in
a foreign country, it would probably prevent or preempt the
establishment of a similar investment by other countries.
Assuming that rapport and goodwill were established by the
U.S. management, the foreign country would probably be
receptive to other types of U.S. investments. Some countries
allow the establishment of only one foreign industry in an
area, or the country may even permit a monopoly in order to
induce and insure an adequate return on a large investment.
Also, a company which has established itself and a market
has a definite competitive advantage over a newcomer.
Accordingly, controls will eventually degrade our overall
.
position.
Recommendations to Restore the Balance
Since common sense dictates that we cure our balance
of payments deficit through economic adjustments rather than
by artificial stimulation and restrictions, the following
recommendations are made to bring about a balance and
inevitably a surplus in the U.S. balance of payments:
1. Increase U.S. direct investments overseas subject
to normal economic constraints.
2. Increase foreign portfolio investments in the United
States in order to offset the immediate balance of payments
costs of the direct investments.
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3. Increase U.S. Government borrowing from foreign
governments in order to offset the immediate cost of direct
investments.
4. Decrease U.S. long-term bank loans overseas except
those loans financing U.S. exports. In contrast, U.S.
banks should borrow Euro-dollars commensurate with inter-
national dollar stability until repatriation of earnings
from direct investments offset the deficit. After a surplus
is achieved through direct investment returns, allow eco-
nomic conditions to determine long-term bank loans.
5. After a surplus has been achieved and long-term
bank loans stabilized, remove the interest equalization
tax to allow economic conditions to determine the movement
of portfolio investments.
Repatriated earnings
Even if these recommendations were not followed, the
United States by not tampering with the economic flow of
repatriated earnings, everything else remaining constant,
could eventually return to an overall surplus in its balance
of payments accounts through the surplus generated by its
private investment account. With over $70 billion of over-
seas direct investments which earn over $7 billion, new
direct investments from earnings in the first year would be





Other measures which would improve the balance
include
:
1. Maintenance of U.S. domestic cost and price sta-
bility. Note that if the United States does not maintain
a reasonable domestic cost and price stability, any measure
to restore the balance would be superfluous as inflation
would deteriorate our trade balance to an extent that no
measures short of devaluation of the dollar could restore
the balance.
2. Maintenance of high interest rates without arti-
ficial supports.
3. A deflation or recession in the United States which
would lower export prices, reduce imports, and attract over-
seas investments by the attractiveness of good investments
at reduced prices. This is an economic solution and bad
domestic politics.
4-. Maintenance of domestic financial fiscal responsi-
bility. This would reduce governmental induced inflationary
pressures. Such fiscal responsibility would also further
enhance international confidence in the U.S. dollar.
5. Establishment of a positive effective tourist pro-
gram which would entice foreign visitors to the United
States.
6. Elimination of non-tariff barrier restrictions by
foreign countries such as Great Britain's requirement that
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a stun equal to 50 per cent of the import value will be
deposited with British customs for six months.
7. Reduction of import quotas and restrictions that
are in reality unfair trade practices. Japan import restric-
tions include 121 items that U.S. officials state are in
violation of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
provisions. "Henry Ford II, chairman of Ford Motor Co.,
called the Japanese attitude toward import restrictions "kind
2
of stupid.'" However, some Japanese argue that they must
liberalize because of the growing protectionist attitude in
the United States."5
8. Elimination of strikes which adversely affect our
balance of payments such as the 1968 East Coast dock strike
4.
and copper strike. The copper mining strike was estimated
to have cost the United States $80 million a month in
5balance of payments losses.
Philip Shabecoff, "U.S. Ties with Japan Face Growing
Strain as Economic Frictions Multiply," The New York Times
,
October 8, 1968, p. 77, col. 1.
p
"U.S. Wins Only Few of Concessions Sought in Japan
Trade Talks," Wall Street Journal
,
December 30, 1968, p. 10,
col. 1.
5Ibid.
4U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, A Review
of Balance of Payments Policies (Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1969), p. 5«
5
-'U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Joint
Economic Report 1968 (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing
Office, 1968), p. 76.
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9. Reduction of prices by industries on certain exports
in order to compete in foreign markets and at the same time
maintain plant capacity. Of course, "dumping" cannot be
allowed. For example, U.S. cold-rolled sheet steel is being
sold in Japan for about $118 a ton while the price in the
United States is $144 a ton. At least the steel plants are
recovering some fixed costs on what otherwise would be idle
capacity. Also, 100 per cent of AID financed steel for
foreign countries must be made in the United States, and
2this amounts to 40 per cent of total steel exports.
10. Replacing government assistance programs such as AID
with private enterprise groups. These private groups should
have the dominant major role in economic development of
less developed countries. The Atlantic Community Develop-
ment Group for Latin America (ADELA) cited in the 1965 Joint
Economic Report is a good example. Another company formed
in February 1969 is the Private Investment Company in Asia
(PICA). This company is capitalized at $40 million with
one-third of the investment being from the United States and
4two-thirds being from other foreign countries.
"Steel Mills Sharply Boost Export Sales; Prices
Slashed in Bid to Open New Markets," Wall Street Journal
,
December 27, 1968, p. 5, col. 3*
2Ibid.




4John Hallon, "Private Investment Company for Asia,"
Congressional Record
,




While President Nixon's approach to reversal of
investment controls appears to be cautions, the creation of
the Overseas Investment Corporation on December 30, 1969, to
mobilize and facilitate the use of U.S. private capital and
skills in the economic and social progress of less developed
countries should have a profound positive effect on our
future balance of payments. The corporation, with a very
modest appropriation of $20 million to start, will guarantee
private investment in underdeveloped countries against loss
due to confiscation, expropriation, war, revolution, or
insurrection. While there appears to be considerable
ambivalence between direct government controls restricting
investments and the Foreign Assistance Act encouraging
investments, it appears that this ambivalence could be slowly
resolved if President Nixon were to stabilize the economy and
move toward the further liberalization of overseas investment
controls.
It is concluded that, with the income and growth
that could be provided especially through direct investments,
the United States in years to come could enjoy a healthy
surplus in its balance of payments. This surplus would
allow the United States to pursue its international political
and military objectives with its international financial
1U.S., Statutes at Large
,




leadership, policies, and position substantially contribut-




DEFINITIONS BY THE DEPARTMENT OP COMMERCE
OF THE ACCOUNTS IN THE
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Source: U.S., Department of Commerce, Dictionary
of Economic and Statistical Terms (Washing-
ton, D.C. : Government Printing Office,
August, 1969), pp. 21-43.

TERM DEFINITION
Exports of Goods and Services
(Line 1)
Exports of goods and services represent the sum of all credits
from merchandise exports, transfers of goods and services
under military sales contracts and military grants, transporta-
tion and travel receipts, fees and royalties from direct invest-
ments, other private and U.S. Government service receipts,
and income on U.S. investments abroad.
By far the largest component of this category is the merchan-
dise export account. This includes all goods sold, given away,
or otherwise transferred from the United States to foreign
areas.
Line 1 is the sum of lines 3 through 13.
Exports of Goods and Services, Ex-
cluding Transfers from Military Grants
(Line 2)
A total for exports of goods and services excluding transfers
under military grants is calculated because these transfers are
considered to be of a special type of transaction that may be
separated out in an analytical evaluation of the balance of
payments. Exports under military grants are also omitted from
exports of goods and services in the GNP account but are
reflected there in Government expenditures. The entry for ex-
ports under line 5, Military grants (a credit) is exactly offset




The merchandise export account is based primarily on the
official export statistics of the Census Bureau but with the
addition of various adjustments to bring them into conformity
with balance-of-payments concepts. This account includes,
with certain exceptions, all goods which are sold, given away,
or otherwise transferred from the U.S. to foreign ownership.
Since foreign branches and subsidiaries of American com-
panies are considered as foreign rather than as domestic busi-
nesses, shipments to them are treated as merchandise exports.
Export shipments are valued at the time and place of export-
that is, at actual selling price. o' at cost if not sold, including
inland freight; insurance, and other charges to the place of
export. This export valuation concept is referred to as exports
f.a.s. (free alongside ship).
All shipments by the Department of Defense (D.O.D.) of grant-
aid military equipment and supplies under the Mutual Security
Program and transfers under military sales contracts are ex-
cluded from the merchandise export data. Shipments of goods
to our own armed forces and diplomatic missions abroad are
not considered to be foreign transactions and are excluded
both from the Census Bureau's export statistics and from the
balance-of-payments compilations.
Thus, the overall balance-of-payments effects of D.O.D. foreign
transactions are separated from the more generally defined
merchandise trade trends.






Transfers Under Military Sales
Contracts
(Line 4)
Transfers under military sales contracts are transfers to for-
eign governments or companies that are arranged directly v/ith
the Department of Defense, rather than a private business firm
in the United States. For example, an export shipment of mili-
tary aircraft and equipment to a NATO country is included in
line 4 only if the order was placed through the D.O.D. The trans-
fers include both goods and services and can be made from
the U.S. as well as from overseas military bases.
Transfers Under Military Grants, Net
(Line 5)
Transfers under military grants consist of the value of the
actual shipments of goods and the rendering of services to
foreign governments. It should be noted that the shipment of
goods need not necessarily be in the form of an export from
the United States. It can represent the transfer of goods from
U.S. military stocks located abroad to foreign recipient coun-
tries.
Under the provisions of the Defense Department's military
grant program, a wide range of military goods and services are
transferred to allies who cannot afford to finance their national
defense programs entirely from their own resources. The aim
of this program is to strengthen the national defense of those
countries which are considered essential to our own defense.
Greece, Turkey, and South Korea, to mention a few, are coun-
tries that have received grants under the program.
In the balance of payments, military grants are recorded on a
net basis-that is, reverse grants and returns on grants are
netted out.
Inasmuch as military grants do not require reimbursement
from abroad, an identical offsetting entry-a debit figure-is
made in line 28.
Transportation
(Line 6)
Transportation receipts arise principally from the following
types of transactions:
• Freight revenues of U.S. operated ocean and air carriers
(also rail and pipeline) for the carriage of U.S. exports
from a U.S. port of exit to a foreign port of entry. This is
based on the fact that the export value of the merchandise
is on an f.a.s. basis—that is, it includes U.S. inland freight
charges from the point of origin to the point of export.
The carriage of U.S. exports by a foreign-operated carrier
is not a ba!ance-of-payments transaction because the for-
eign importer of the goods pays a foreign carrier and there
is, therefore, no U.S. international receipt involved. The
convention adapted in the balance of payments is that in
any merchandise trade transaction, the importer ulti-
mately pays the freight.
• Freight revenues of U.S. operated carriers for the carriage
of foreign freight (and passengers) from one foreign point
to another foreign point.
• International travel fare receipts of U.S. ocean and air
carriers from foreign travelers to the United States, cover-






• Port expenditure receipts, representing payments for
goods and services purchased in the U.S. by foreign
transportation companies.




Receipts associated with travel by foreign residents in the U.S.
are recorded in the balance of payments as exports of goods
and services. Expenditures made in the U.S. by foreigners for
lodging, food, amusements, gifts, and other purchases con-
stitute a receipt (a credit) in the travel account. International
travel fares paid to U.S. airlines by foreigners traveling to the
United States are not included in this line but are included
instead in line 6, Transportation.
The flow in the opposite direction-expenditures of U.S. resi-
dents traveling abroad-appears in line 18, Travel.
Fees and Royalties from Direct
Investments
(Line 8)
Fees and royalties are reported by companies with direct in 1
vestments abroad. They represent income received by U.S.
parent companies from their foreign affiliates for patent royal-
ties, licensing fees, rentals, management services, other home
office charges, and research and development.
Other Private Services
(Line 9)
Other private services represent receipts from unaffiliated
foreign entities for a variety of miscellaneous services. They
include, in addition to royalties and fees described in line 8,
such service transactions as the foreign contract operations
of U.S. engineering, contracting, and consulting firms; inter-
national cable, radio, and telephone operations of U.S. com-
munications companies; international reinsurance transac1
tions; and rental receipts from the showing of U.S. motion
pictures in foreign countries. Also included in this category are
receipts obtained from the operation and maintenance ex-
penses of foreign government embassies and international
organizations (e.g., the United Nations) in the United States.
These transactions are in this line rather than in line 10, other
U.S. Government services, because they are received by the
U.S. private sector.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 19, Private
payments for other services.
Receipts from Other U.S. Government
Services
(Line 10)
Receipts from other U.S. Government services relate mostly
to services provided under nonmilitary aid programs. They also
include income earned by American embassies in the process-
ing of visas and other consular activities. A large part of the
income is derived through the operation of the Panama Canal.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 20, U.S.





Income on U.S. Investments Abroad:
Direct Investments
(Lino 11)
Income on U.S. investments abroad consists primarily of divi-
dends, interest, and branch profits paid or credited by foreign
subsidiaries and branches to their parent companies in the
United States. Income in the form of fees, royalties, and other
service charges received by U.S. direct investment companies
from their foreign affiliates is included in line 8. Fees and royal-
ties from direct investments.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 21, Income
on foreign investments in the United States: private payments.
Income on U.S. Investments Abroad:
Other Private Assets
(Line 12)
Other private assets consist of interest income derived by in-
dividuals and private banks and other organizations in the U.S.
from holdings of foreign bonds, bank deposits, and other
claims. They also include dividends on the holdings of U.S.
residents of foreign equity shares. The income received is
recorded net of foreign taxes.




Interest income received by the U.S. Government on long- and
short-term loans outstanding to the rest of the worid is reported
in line 13 An example is the interest on long-term project and
development loans made by the Agency for International De-
velopment to the developing nations of the world. Interest
earned on Export-Import Bank loans and from PL 480 counter-
part fund deposits in commercial banks abroad is included.
Also included is interest received on U.S. holdings of conver-
tible foreign currencies.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 22, Income on
foreign investments in the United States: U.S. Government
payments.
Imports of Goods and Services
(Line 14)
Imports of goods and services represent the sum of all pay-
ments for merchandise imports, military expenditures, trans-
portation and travel costs, other private and U.S. Government
services, and income and service payments to foreign parent
companies by their affiliates operating in the United States.
By far the largest component of this category is merchandise
imports, which includes all goods bought or otherwise trans-
ferred from a forej^n country to the United States. However,
military and foreign travel expenditures, international trans-
portation payments, and income payments on foreign invest-
ments in the U.S. are also of considerable significance.
Military expenditures are those payments abroad that are
connected with our military piograms in foreign areas.
Expenditures for travel by Americans abroad include payments
closely connected with travel such as lodging, food, amuse-












International transportation payments consist principally of
payments to foreign carriers of U.S. imports, payments for
charter hire of foreign flag vessels, and travel fares paid to
foreign international airlines by U.S. residents traveling to and
from abroad.
Line 14 is the sum of lines 15 through 22.
See also Exports of goods and services, p. 27 .
The merchandise import account, like the merchandise export
account, is based primarily on the official trade statistics of
the Census Bureau. A number of adjustments are applied to
the Census figures to bring them into conformity with balance
of payments concepts. This account includes, with certain
exceptions, all nonmilitary goods which are transferred from a
foreign country to the United States.
Imports of military goods-including uranium—are excluded
from this account because they are included elsewhere, under
line 16, Military expenditures.
Goods which enter Customs bonded warehouses are included
as well as goods released from Customs custody immediately
upon arrival. Nonmilitary Government imports are also entered
in this account. In addition, since foreign branches and sub-
sidiaries of American companies are considered foreign rather
than domestic, goods shipped from these branches and sub-
sidiaries are treated as merchandise imports.
Merchandise imports are, in general, priced in the accounts
at the wholesale market value in the country in which they are
produced and, therefore, exclude United States import duties,
ocean freight, and marine insurance. In general, this approxi-
mates an f.o.b. (free on board) exporting country basis. More
specifically, it is a price determined in accordance with statu-
tory regulations of the Bureau of Customs and forms the basis
for the calculation of ad valorem import duties. It is not neces-
sarily the actual price at which the goods were purchased.
See also General imports, p. 52 .
Department of Defense (D.O.D.) expenditures abroad are ex-
penditures connected with our military programs in foreign
areas. Included in this line are D.O.D. purchases of goods and
services in foreign countries. Services include direct labor or
contract expenses paid to U.S. subsidiaries operating abroad
(a foreign company in the balance-of-payments definitions) as
well as to foreign business firms. Also included is that portion
of military personnel pay disbursements spent outside of the
United States-or outside United States installations abroad
(e.g., post exchanges, commissaries). Note that expenditures
for supplies, equipment, vehicles, aircraft, for example, pur-
chased in the U.S. and then shipped to U.S. armed forces in-
stallations abroad arc net balance-of-payments transactions,
nor are they included in export statistics of the Census Bureau.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 4, Transfers







Transportation payments reflect principally the following typos
of transactions:
• Freight payments to foreign-operated ocean, air, rail, and
pipeline carriers for the carriage of U.S. imports from the
foreign market to a U.S. port of entry. U.S. trade statistics
value merchandise imports on a f.o.b. (free on board)
foreign market basis. The carriage of U.S. imports by U.S.
operated carriers is not a balance-of-payments transaction
because the U.S. importer pays a U.S. carrier and there is,
therefore, no international payment involved.
• International travel fare payments to foreign ocean and
air carriers by U.S. residents traveling between the U.S.
and foreign countries.
• Port expenditure payments, representing purchases of
goods and services in foreign countries by U.S. operators
and transportation companies.
• Charter hire payments made to foreign owners of vessels
by U.S. resident firms operating these vessels on a rental
basis.





Expenditures in foreign countries associated with travel abroad
by American residents are recorded in the balance of payments
as impo.ts of goods and services. Expenditures of U.S. resi-
dents traveling in foreign countries for food, lodging, amuse-
ments, and gifts constitute a payment in the travel account.
There are several notable exceptions in the treatment of some
expenditure items in the travel account. Expenditures by U.S.
Government employees stationed abroad are not included in
the travel account, but rather in line 20, Other U.S. Government
services and in line 16, Military expenditures. Also, private U.S.
citizens living abroad are considered to be foreign residents
and their expenditures, therefore, are excluded from this
account.
In addition, travel fares paid to foreign-owned international
airlines by U.S. residents traveling from the United States to
foreign destinations are omitted from the travel account but
are included instead in line 17.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 7, Travel.
Private Payments for Other Services
(Line 19)
This account represents U.S. payments to foreign entities for
a variety of miscellaneous services. It includes royalties, fees,
and other service payments made to foreign parent companies
by their affiliates located in the United States.
Among the major types of miscellaneous service transactions
(other than between affiliates) included in this account are:
royalties and licensing fees; international cable, radio, and
telephone charges; insurance and reinsurance; film rental pay-
ments for foreign films shown in the United States; and ex-
penditures of U.S. filmmakers in foreign countries. Also in-
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Private Payments for Other Services
(Line 19) (Cont'd)
eluded are wage remittances to their home countries of
foreign migrant laborers working in the United States.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 9, Other
private services.
U.S. Government Payments for
Other Services
(Line 20)
U.S. Government payments for other services include a wide
range of activities. Examples include salaries and allowances
to State Department employees assigned to the embassies
throughout the world, rental payments for embassy buildings,
and subscriptions to international organizations such as the
United Nations.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 10, Receipts
from other U.S. Government services.
Income on Foreign Investments in
the United States: Private Payments
(Line 21)
Income on foreign investments in the United States (private
payments) includes branch profits, dividends, and interest paid
by U.S. affiliates of foreign companies. It also includes inter-
est and dividend payments to foreign holders of U.S. com-
panies' bonds and stocks, and interest on other debt including
liquid liabilities by private banks to foreigners.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 11, Income
on U.S. investments abroad: direct investments.
Income on Foreign Investments in the
U.S.: U.S. Government Payments
(Line 22)
United States Government interest payments to foreigners who
hold Federal securities are included in line 22. The major por-
tion of these payments goes to foreign governments which hold
the obligations as part of their monetary reserves. This entry
also includes interest on foreign deposits in the U.S. Treasury
—deposits that are used primarily to facilitate payment for
goods and services received under Department of Defense
contracts.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 13, Income
on U.S. Government investments abroad: U.S. Government
assets.
Balance on Goods and Services
(Line 23)
Excluding Transfers Under Military
Grants
(Line 24)
The balance on goods and services is the algebraic sum cf
exports and imports of goods and services. It includes mer-
chandise trade (exports and imports of goods) and the so-
called "invisible" items-shipping charges, income on invest-
ments, rents, royalties, payments for insurance, donations, and
travel.
Line 24, Balance on goods and services, excluding transfers
under military grants, is given in order to show the relation-
ship between flows of goods and services and capital plus
reserve movements. Transfers made under military grants are
accounted for in two exactly offsetting entries-lines 5 and 22
and, therefore, have no net effect on the other flows in the
balance of payments.
A surplus balance on goods and services is compatible with





Balance on Goods and Services
(Line 23)
Excluding Transfers Undei Military
Grants
(Line 24) (Cont'd)
reserves. On the other hand, a deficit balance on goods and
services must be financed by an import of capital or a drawing
down of foreign exchange reserves.
The balance on goods and services, excluding transfers under
military grants, corresponds to the net exports of goods and
services in the National Income and Product Accounts (line 35




Net unilateral transfers are those for which no goods, services,
or payments are received in return. They encompass an ex-
tremely wide range of activity by private citizens and institu-
tions and by the Federal Government.
The private unilateral transfers include all noncommercial pay-
ments such as institutional gifts of cash and goods associated
with foreign relief work and personal remittances to foreigners.
There are three major kinds of government transfers abroad:
• Transfers under the Department of Defense military grant
program.
• Nonmilitary grants of goods or money to the developing
nations of the world by the U.S. Agency for International
Development.
• U.S. Government transfers in the form of social security,
civil service, veterans' and railroad retirement pension
payments to Americans residing abroad.
Unilateral Transfers; Net; Transfers
to Foreigners: Excluding Military
Grants
(Line 26)
A total for unilateral transfers, excluding military grants, is
included to provide figures consistent with line 2, Exports of
goods and services excluding military grant transfers, and
line 24, Balance on goods and services excluding military
grant transfers. Transfers under the military grant program
are accounted for in two exactly offsetting entries, lines 5 and
28, and, therefore, have no net effect on the balance-of-pay-
ments statistics.
Line 25 is the sum of lines 27 through 30.
Private Remittances
(Line 27)
Private remittances represent transfers or transmissions of
cash and goods by individuals and by charitable and nonprofit
institutions to individuals or groups residing abroad.
Personal remittances include all noncommercial transfers of
funds abroad by means of customary bank drafts and money
orders. The remittances include gifts, inheritances, and tax
payments. In addition to these cash remittances, an estimate
is included for the value of goods forwarded abroad as gifts.
In the case of gifts mailed abroad, an equal export entry (an
offsetting credit) is made to the merchandise account.
Institutional unilateral transfers of cash and goods arise from
foreign relief work in the developing nations of the world.
Approximately 135 religious and charitable agencies are cur-







Military Grants of Goods and Services
(Line 28)
Included also are receipts by U.S. residents— principally Ger-
man and Austrian-of indemnifications of losses sustained as
a result of actions by the German Government prior to and
during World War II.
The Defense Department's military grant program provides
goods and services to the military organizations of allied coun-
tries that cannot afford to finance their national defense pro-
grams entirely from their own resources.
Under the program, the U.S. does not require reimbursement
from abroad for the shipment of these goods and the rendering
of these services to foreign governments. Unilateral transfers
for military grants of goods and services comprise simply the
identical offsetting entry of line 5 in the Balance of Payments
Accounts, and represent no actual financial transactions.
Other U.S. Government Grants
(Line 29)
For balance of payments purposes, Government grants are
defined as transfers of resources (goods, services, and cash)
for which no payment is expected, or for which repayment
terms have not yet been determined. More than half of the
nonmilitary grant programs are administered by the Agency
for International Development (AID).
The actual goods (for instance, machinery for an irrigation
project) and services (for instance, transportation or technical
assistance by an agricultural expert) financed by the grant are
recorded in lines 3, 6, and 10, respectively, in the balance of
payments. But because an offsetting entry for these resources
is required and because no payment is received, a debit for
them is created and recorded in line 29, Other U.S. Govern-
ment grants under unilateral transfers.
U.S. Government Pensions and
Other Transfers
(Line 30)
Balance on Goods, Services, and
Unilateral Transfers
(Line 31)
U.S. Government pensions consist of payments of .social
security benefits and civil service, veterans, and railroad retire-
ment pensions to Americans residing abroad, or to foreigners
entitled to such payments. These payments constitute ap-
proximately 80 percent of the total amount of this category.
Other transfer payments abroad for U.S. educational and cul-
tural exchange programs which are administered by the De-
partment of State are also included here. A small amount of
the transfers included in this account supports research at
foreign universities.
The balance on'goods, services, and unilateral transfers repre-
sents the balance on current account which-except for errors
and omissions-must be counterbalanced by capital move-
ments, a change in official reserves, or both.
All transactions involving transfers of goods and services are
included in the current account, with the exception of monetary
gold transactions, which are recorded in line 47, as a com-





Balance on Goods', Services, and
Unilateral Transfers
(Line 31) (Cont'd)
The balance on goods, services, and unilateral transfers is net
foreign investment by the United States; see discussion in
Introduction to Part II.
Transactions in U.S. Private Assets,
Net
(Line 32)
Transactions in U.S. private ascets include acquisitions and
sales by U.S. private residents of assets held abroad. These
transactions are placed in four principal categories:
• Direct investments abroad by U.S. corporations
• Purchases by U.S. residents of newly issued and outstand-
ing foreign securities
• Long-term and short-term claims on foreigners reported by
U.S. banks
• Long-term and short-term claims (not included in direct
investments) reported by U.S. residents other than banks.
Line 32 is the sum of lines 33 through 40.
Direct Investments
(Line 33)
U.S. direct investment abroad is the flow of U.S. capital into
foreign business enterprise in which U.S. residents have sig-
nificant control. Hence the capital movements are deemed to
be foreign extensions of the management interests of the
parent corporation. The distinction between long-term invest-
ments in equity securities and direct investment is made on
the basis of ownership. Investment is considered direct when
the U.S. individual or company owns more than 10 percent of
the foreign concern.
The flows included in the balance-of-payments report are:
• Short- and long-term funds invested by the U.S. parent
corporation
• Transfers by the U.S. parent corporation to the foreign
affiliate (or to foreign residents as compensation for the
acquisition of equity interests) of funds that had been
borrowed abroad by the U.S. parent or its U.S. affiliates.
The flows not included in the balance-of-payments report
(although they affect the net worth of the investment) are:
• Depreciation allowances and reinvested earnings of foreign
subsidiaries
• Changes in foreign assets that result from political actions
or natural causes abroad.
These latter transactions involve no transfer of funds between
the U.S. parent and its foreign affiliate.
Portfolio capital flows are recorded in lines 34 and 36 of the
balance of payments. The flow in the opposite direction ap-










Other Transactions in Foreign
Securities
(Line 36) >
All purchases and sales of foreign securities in U.S. markets
reported by U.S. banks, brokers, dealers, or individuals from
or to the account of a foreign seller or buyer are included in the
U.S. balance of payments. All security transactions represent
the amounts of dollars paid to or received from the foreign
seller or buyer, after deducting discounts and commissions.
In the balance of payments these transactions are shown in
three separate lines-nameiy, new issues, redemptions, and
other transactions. Purchases of newly issued foreign se-
curities (a debit) are recorded in line 34, while the net result
of other transactions (either purchases-a debit-or sales-a
credit) in outstanding foreign securities is recorded in line 36.
When a foreign security originally issued in the U.S. is re-
deemed, a credit (a dollar inflow) is recorded in line 35.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 52, U.S.
securities other than treasury issues.
Claims Reported by U.S. Banks:
Long-Term
(Line 37)
Long-term claims reported by U.S. banks represent commer-
cial bank loans to foreigners. These loans may go to private
business, individuals, or foreign governments. A large part cf
these comprise loans for foreign corporations, including loans
to finance ship mortgages. U.S. exports, plant expansion, and
to refinance debts outstanding. A loan is considered long-term
if its repayment schedule is for more than one year.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 53, Long-
term liabilities reported by U.S. banks.
Claims Reported by U.S. Banks:
Short-Term
(Lii.e 38)
Short-terrn claims include loans extended to foreigners with a
maturity of less than one year. Loans to foreign banks for the
purpose of financing general trade transactions on foreign ac-
counts and short-term bank claims in foreign currencies that
represent correspondent balances held in the bank's own
account abroad are included.
Nonbank claims such as outstanding collections held in the
bank's custody or short-term investments in foreign money
market assets are also included.
Claims Reported by U.S. Residents
Other Than Banks: Long-Term
(Line 39)
Long-term claims reported by U.S. residents other than banks
are, mainly, those reported by private business firms resulting
from their export transactions. These claims assume various
forms. A common example is "supplier's credit." This is the
long-term financing extended to a foreigner by a U.S. corpora-
tion in orrior that it may sell its product abroad. Long-term






Claims Reported by U.S. Residents
Other Than Banks: Short-Term
(Line 40)
Short-term claims reported by U.S. residents other than banks
include those reported by U.S. brokerage houses. Thoso
claims may be in the form of a cash account held by the
broker. Also included are ether short-term financial assets
held abroad such as the unused proceeds of loan flotations by
vU.S. corporations in foreign capital markets.
Transactions in U.S. Government
Assets, Excluding Official Reserve
Assets, Net
(Line 41)
Transactions in U.S. Government assets, excluding official
reserve assets, include loans and credit e/tensions of the
Federal Government to foreign countries, the U.S. Govern-
ment's holdings of foreign currencies abroad, and scheduled
and nonscheduled repayments resulting from these loans.
These transactions include long-term capital assistance loans
provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development
to the developing countries of the world, loans provided under
PL 4S0 by the Export-Import Bank, and capital subscriptions to
international lending organizations.
These capital outflows increase the net U.S. foreign claims on
the countries receiving the loans, or on international organiza-
tions.
Line 41 is the sum of lines 42 through 45.
Loans and Other Long-Term Assets
(Line 42)
A part of total transactions in U.S. Government assets, this
account includes the flow of capital abroad resulting from all
loans and credits with an original maturity of more than one
year made by the Federal Government to foreign countries.
Most of these credits finance U.S. exports of goods and serv-
ices.
In 1968 long-term dollar loans under the defense and economic
development programs administered by the Agency for Inter-
national Development (AID) accounted for less than one-third
of total U.S. Government long-term foreign lending; Export-
Import Bank dollar credits accounted for over 40 percent; and
dollar and foreign currency loans extended under Public Law
480, about 25 percent. The remaining long-term credit trans-
actions include principally credits related to the sale of military
equipment.
oreign Currencies and Other Assets
(Line 43)
The U.S. Government's holdings of foreign currencies included
in this account consist of changes in holdings of Indian rupees,
Chilean escudos. and other "soft" currencies. Changes in con-
vertible or ''hard" curfencies-dollars, marks, lire-are included
in line 48. A net increase of soft currencies results primarily
from the sale of U.S. surplus agricultural products in exchange
for local currency. Loan principal and interest repayments
made by a foreign government in its own currency are also in-
cluded in this account.
In addition to changes in its foreign currency holdings result-
ing from these sources, the U.S. also deliberately purchases




Foreign Currencies and Other Assets
(Line 43) (Cont'd)
abroad such as the day-to-day expenses of an American em-
bassy. Inasmuch as these currency holdings represent assets
owned by the U.S. Government, their changes must be reflected
in the balance of payments.
Repayments on Credits:
Scheduled and Nonscheduled
(Lines 44 and 45)
,* Repayments on credits are the amortization of loans resulting
from U.S. Government capital assistance programs to foreign
countries. The repayment period on these loans is relatively
long and the interest rate is small.
Scheduled repayments of principal are recorded in line 44; the
accompanying interest repayment is recorded in income on
U.S. Government assets abroad (line 13). In recent years thesa
repayments have reached almost $1 billion annually.
Nonscheduled repayments (line 45) are mainly prepayments
by foreign governments on their outstanding loans. Also in-




U.S. Official Reserve Transactions in U.S. official reserve assets consist of three
items: (1) changes in U.S. gold reserve holdings, (2) changes
in the U.S. holdings of convertible foreign currencies, and (3)
changes in the U.S. gold tranche position in the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) which consists of the virtually automatic
drawing rights of the United States from the IMF. This item
indicates whether the U.S. is gaining or losing international
reserves.
When the changes in total U.S. liabilities to foreign official
monetary institutions-liabilities that represent reserve assets
of those institutions-are added algebraically to the change in
official reserve assets, the result is the balance-of-payments
surplus or deficit on an official reserve transactions basis. (See
lines 13-20 in Table 3 contained in the Introduction to this part,
p. 24.)
Line 46 is the sum of lines 47 through 49.
Gold
(Line 47)
The U.S. Treasury buys gold from and sells gold to foreign
governments, central banks, and international financial organi-
zations. These official transactions take place at the estab-
lished rate of $35 per fine troy ounce (plus or minus handling
charges). By international agreement the U.S. Treasury and
other leading central banks now buy gold from and sell gold
to only official monetary agencies and limit their gold trans-
actions to the stocks held by official institutions. Thus, varia-
tions in thq U.S. monetary gold stock occur now only as a
result of international transactions between the U.S. and
foreign monetary authorities. Private buyers-including indus-
try and the arts-must purchase gold from private sellers, in-
cluding primary producers, at whatever price prevails in this
market. This is known as the two-tier gold system.
The Treasury conducts its gold transactions with foreign mone-







Stabilization Fund, which is not included in the figures re-
ported for the Treasury's gold stock. The Federal Reserve Bank




Gold Tranche Position in IMF
(Line 49)
Convertible currencies include the U.S. Treasury and Federal
Reserve holdings of foreign currencies that are counted as
part of official U.S. reserve assets.
Changes in U.S. holdings of foreign currencies result primarily
from reciprocal currency arrangements. The U.S. has recipro-
cal currency arrangements under which the U.S. may exchange
dollars for other currencies under certain conditions and up
to agreed upon limits with a number of countries and the
Bank for International Settlements. After a stated period of
time, the transaction may be reversed. These arrangements
are commonly referred to as "swap arrangements." Their
purpose is to provide a mechanism to absorb the initial shock
of unusually heavy movements of funds in international ex-
changes, thereby permitting gold to play a much less actiye
role in the settlement of temporary imbalances. While a swap
agreement does not affect the surplus or deficit in the balance
of payments, it allows the U.S. (or other participating country)
to finance a deficit for a short period without reducing its
gold and foreign exchange assets.
The gold tranche position in the IMF represents the amount
that the United States can draw (borrow) in foreign currencies
virtually automatically from the International Monetary Fund
if such borrowings are needed to finance a balance-of-pay-
ments deficit. The gold tranche itself is determined by the
U.S. quota paid in gold minus the holdings of dollars by the
IMF in excess of the dollar portion of the U.S. quota.
Transactions of the IMF in a member country's currency are
transactions in monetary reserves. When the Fund sells dollars
to other countries to enable them to finance their internation-
al payments, the net position of the U.S. in the Fund is im-
proved. An improvement in the net position in the gold tranche
is similar to an increase in the reserve assets of the United
States. On the other hand, when the U.S. buys other currencies
from the Fund, or when other countries use dollars to meet
obligations to the Fund, the net position of the U.S. in the Fund
is reduced.
"ransactions in Foreign Assets in the
Jnited States, Net
i :,-.~ tax(Line 50)
Transactions in foreign assets in the United States in-
elude a wide range of private and government international
transactions. These capital flows are divided into four
categories:
• Foreign direct investment in the United States for the
purpose of acquiring equity interests in U.S. enterprises
or expanding foreign assets in foreign branches and
subsidiaries in the United States
• Foreign purchases and sales of U.S. securities other than









• Long-term deposits by foreigners in U.S. commercial
banks
• U.S. Treasury bonds, notes, deposits, and money market
paper held in the United States.
Line 50 is the sum of lines 51 through 59.
Direct Investments
(Line 51)
Foreign direct investment in the U.S. is the flow of foreign
capital into U.S. business enterprise in which foreign residents
have significant control. Hence, the capital movements are re-
garded as foreign extensions of the management interests cf
the parent corporation. The distinction between long-term in-
vestment in equity securities and foreign direct investment in
the U.S. is made on the basis of ownership. Investment is
considered direct when the foreign individual or company
owns more than 25 percent of the U.S. concern.
The flows included in the balance-of-payments report are:
• Short- and long-term funds invested by the foreign parent
corporation
• Transfers by the foreign corporation to the U.S. affiliate
(or to U.S. residents as compensation for the acquisition
of equity interests) of funds that had been borrowed in
the U.S. by the foreign parent or its foreign affiliates.
The .flows not included in the balance-of-payments report
(although they affect the net worth of the investment) are:
• Depreciation allowances and reinvested earnings of U.S.
subsidiaries
• Changes in U.S. assets that result from political actions
or natural causes in the United States.
These latter transactions involve no transfer of funds between
the foreign parent and its U.S. affiliates.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 33, Direct
investments.
U.S. Securities Other Than Treasury
Issues
(Line 52)
This line includes data on foreign purchases and sales of
U.S. stocks and bonds. Treasury issues are excluded here,
but bonds issued by U.S. Government agencies and by local
governments are included.
Since the growth of European capital markets, a large part
of these foreign purchases have consisted of U.S. corporate
issues for the purpose of financing U.S. direct investments in
their foreign affiliates. If the capital raised by these U.S.
corporations (often referred to as Delaware corporations)
is not used immediately and the money is deposited abroad
in a bank, a debit entry is made in line 40, Claims reported
by U.S. residents other than banks.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in lines 34, For-
eign securities newly issued in the United States, 35, Re-




Long-Term Liabilities Reported by
U.S. Banks
(Line 53)
Long-term liabilities reported by U.S. banks include long-term
deposits— in excess of one year—by foreigners in U.S. banks,
mainly by foreign official or international agencies.
Some of these liabilities consist of deposits used to finance
U.S. imports, plant expansion, and other financial transactions
which would involve U.S. banking services, such as a for-
eign government's line of credit to a U.S. bank.
The flow in the opposite direction appears in line 37, Claims
reported by U.S. banks: long-term.
Other Liabilities Reported by U.S.
Private Residents Oilier Than Banks:
Lon<£-Term
(Line 54)
Other long-term liabilities reported by U.S. private residents
other than banks represent indebtedness of U.S. corporations
to foreigners. Long-term suppliers' credits incurred by U.S.
businessmen from foreign suppliers are included in this item.
The major portion of such indebtedness incurred in recent
years represents loans obtained abroad to finance foreign
direct investments.
Other Liabilities Reported by U.S.
Private Residents Other Than Banks:
Short-Term
(Line 55)
Other short-term liabilities reported by U.S. private residents
other than banks include funds owed by brokers to U.S. pri-
vate residents and short-term suppliers' credits extended to
foreign producers and short-term credits to meet domestic
credit requirements or to finance foreign direct investments.
Nonmarketable Liabilities of U.S.
Government, Including Medium-Term
Securities Payable Prior to Maturity
Only Under Special Conditions: Asso-
ciated With Specific Transactions
(Line 56)
United States Government liabilities associated with specific
transactions are mainly advance payments by foreign govern-
ments to special subscription securities issued to the Depart-
ment of Defense in anticipation of future delivery of military
procurement shipments. Other transactions included are the
International Development Association, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and the United Nations. These latter pay-
ments are in the form of noninterest-bearing, nonmarketable
securities issued in lieu of cash payments. In the past, these
special securities were issued to these international insti-
tutions until such time as they were spent.
Nonmarketahle Liabilities of U.S.
Government, including Medium-Term
Securities Payable Prior to Maturity
Only Under Special Conditions: Other
Medium-Term Securities
(Line 57)
Other medium-term securities include foreign holdings of
nonmarketable, medium-term U.S. Government securities, pay-
able before maturity only under special conditions. Examples
of these are nonconvertible "Roosa Bonds" issued by the
Treasury, and Certificates of Participation representing Ex-





U.S. Treasury Marketable or
Convertible Bonds and Notes
(Line 58)
Deposits and Money Market Paper
Held in the United States
(Line 59)
The U.S. normally owes and is owed money internationally.
The balance of payments must adjust continuously under the
influence of these financial conditions.
When a foreign country earns more than it spends in the U.S.,
there is an increase in the foreign claims on the United States.
This increase may be in the form of a rise in cash balances
deposited in a bank in the U.S., or it may be invested in short-
term liquid money market paper such as Treasury bills,
negotiable certificates of deposit, or bankers' acceptances.
On the other hand, if a foreign country spends more than it
earns in the U.S., there is a decrease in cash balances which
must be reconciled by drawing down the foreign country's
commercial bank deposits or by selling or redeeming the
foreigner's holdings of money market paper or other liquid
assets.
Lines 58 and 59 are included in the balance of payments tc
reflect the adjustments in the foreign holdings of U.S. liquid
liabilities. The buying and selling of U.S. Treasury securiti^s-
with an original maturity of one year or more-are shown in
line 58, while the changes in U.S. short-term liabilities re-
ported by U.S. banks-adjustments in bank deposits and the
investing or disinvesting in money market paper including
short-term Government securities held in custody by the banks
for foreign residents- are reflected in line 53.
In combination, the financial transactions reflected in these
two lines are very important in the overall balance of pay-
ments. The balance on liquidity basis is measured by the
algebraic sum of the changes in U.S. official reserve assets
(line 46) and liquid liabilities to all foreigners (lines 53 and
59). These two accounts measure the deficit or surplus in
the overall balance of payments on a liquidity basis. (See
Lines 1-12, Table 3, p. 24.)
The interaction between lines 58 and 59 and 45 is important.
Frequently, foreign holdings of U.S. Treasury securities a/e
sold in private foreign markets to official government agencies,
rather than sold or liquidated in the United States. Fore'gn
monetary authorities regard these securities as their own
central bank reserves, which may be redeemed in tne United
States for gold. Thus, the sale of U.S. Treasury securities to
foreigners can lead to an increase of U.S. official liabilities
to foreign official holders and subsequently to a decline in
U.S. official reserve assets.
Net Errors and Omissions
(Line 60)
Net errors and omissions is the statistical discrepancy be-
tween total recorded entries under receipts and total re-
corded entries under payments. It is entered as either net
receipts or net payments, as needed in order to fulfill the ac-
counting principle that the sum of receipts and payrr nt
must balance. The source of the discrepancy cannot oe
identified with any precision.
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Exports of goods and services
Excluding transfers under military grants
Merchandise, adjusted, excluding military
Transfers under military sales contracts
Transfers under military grants, net
Transportation
Travel
Fees and royalties from direct investments
Oilier private services
Other U.S. Government services




Imports of goods and services




Private payments for other services
U.S. Government payments for other services
Income on foreign investments in the United States:
Private payments
US. Government payments
Balance on goods and services (lines 1 and 14)
Excluding transfers under military grants (lines 2 and 14)




Military grants of goods and services
Other U.S. Government grants
U.S. Government pensions and other transfers
Balance cr, goods, services, and unilateral transfers (lines 23 and 25, or 24 and 26) ,
Transactions in U.S. private assets, net; increase in assets (—
)
Direct Investments
Foreign securities newly issued in the United States
Redemptions
Other transactions in foreign securities ......
Claims reported by U.S. banks:
Long-term
Short-term
Claims reported by U.S. residents other than banks:
Long-term
Short-term
Transactions in U.S. Government assets, excluding official reserve assets, net; increase in assets (—
)
Leans and other long-term assets
Foreign currencies and other assets
Repayments on credits:
Scheduled ....
Nonscheduled (including sales of foreign obligations to foreigners)
Transactions in U.S. official reserve assets, net; increase in assets (— )
Gold ... ...........
Convertible currencies
Gold tranche position in IMF .........
Transactions in foreign assets in the United States, net; increase in foreign assets (U.S. liabilities) (+)
Direct investments ...............




Long-term liabilities reported by U.S. banks
Other liabilities reported by U.S. private residents other than banks:
Long-term ........ .
Short-term ...
Nonmarketable liabilities of U.S. Government, including medium-term securities payable prior to maturity only under
special conditions:
Associated with specific transactions . .
Other medium-term securities
U.S. Treasury marketable or convertible bonds and notes
Deposits and money market paper held in the United States
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